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ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND




Arbitration agreements in interstate commerce transactions are fa-
vored by the law, particularly by the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.
The choice of the arbitral forum typically is finaL When antitrust dis-
putes arise between parties to arbitration agreements, however, the policy
favoring arbitration clashes with the antitrust laws' reliance on private
enforcement as a primary means for securing the ideal competitive mar-
kets toward which the antitrust laws aim Because private enforcement
of the antitrust laws presupposes a litigation setting, such enforcement
necessarily competes with a preexisting arbitration agreement Courts
typically have resolved the conflict between the two policies in favor of
private litigation of antitrust issues. Professor Allison believes a greater
harmony between the two policies is possible He examines both policies
and calls for different methods by which the two might better accommo-
date one another.
One of the more important developments in twentieth century American
jurisprudence has been the evolution of a generally favorable attitude toward
binding arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.' Perhaps
the most evident reflection of this phenomenon was the enactment and subse-
quent expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.2 Under
the Act, when parties to a transaction involving interstate commerce agree in
writing to submit existing or future disputes to binding arbitration, their choice
of the arbitral forum is generally final and the arbitrator's decision, or award, is
subject only to very limited judicial review.
3
The federal antitrust laws form the core of another extremely important
national policy. 4 The promotion of competitive markets in the interest of en-
t The Mary John & Ralph Spence Centennial Professor, Graduate School of Business, The
University of Texas at Austin; Member of the Texas Bar, J.D. 1972, Baylor University.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 21-77. This Article focuses on commercial arbitration
only; labor arbitration does not play a significant role in the analysis contained in the Article because
the policy conflict examined herein normally arises in commercial disputes. Although commercial
arbitration and labor arbitration possess many common characteristics, the two have traditionally
been viewed as distinct. The federal law governing commercial arbitration, the Federal Arbitration
Act, expressly excludes labor disputes from its coverage. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The enforceability of
arbitration agreements in the labor-management relations context is governed by § 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
2. Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-
14 (1982)).
3. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
4. The most important antitrust statutes are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1982), and
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hancing allocative efficiency, preserving economic freedom of choice, and dis-
couraging perpetuation of-inordinate aggregations of economic power has long
been recognized as a preeminent societal objective in America.5 Private enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws as an adjunct to government enforcement has played a
pivotal role in deterring antitrust violations and in furthering the overall goal of
preserving competition.
6
Private antitrust claims can arise in many contexts. Although a preexisting
contractual relationship between an antitrust plaintiff and defendant is not a
prerequisite to establishing an antitrust violation, it is not uncommon for such a
relationship to have existed. 7 Many antitrust claims have arisen between the
parties to franchise agreements,8 nonfranchise distribution arrangements, 9 con-
tractual joint ventures,10 and patent, trade secret, or other technology licenses. 1
When such contracts contain clauses committing the parties to arbitration of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). Although the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982), provides a statutory basis for antitrust enforcement activity by the Federal
Trade Commission, it cannot be enforced by private parties and has no relevance to the discussion in
this Article, which focuses on private enforcement of the antitrust laws. Another relevant statute,
the Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), is the amended version of § 2 of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
5. Although beyond the scope of this Article, there is lively debate today as to whether eco-
nomic freedom of choice, disaggregation of power, or other objectives are or should be legitimate
goals of antitrust law. Many scholars continue to believe that these are the broad policy goals of the
antitrust laws. See, eg., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 12-20 (2d ed. 1980); L. SULLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 1-14
(1977); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979). There also is
significant scholarly opinion that enhancement of consumer welfare through improved allocative
efficiency is, or at least should be, the only goal of antitrust. See, eg., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 50-89 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTIRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERsPnEvE 4-20 (1976).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 78-90.
7. The great majority of private antitrust claims are asserted under § 1 of the Sherman Act 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which prohibits "contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade."
Id. Under § 1 some contract or other plurality of action among two or more economic entities is a
jurisdictional prerequisite. Often this means joint activity among two or more defendants or among
a defendant and one or more nonparty actors. However, even though a contractual relationship
between plaintiff and defendant is not required for § 1 to apply, such a relationship often exists and
may be used to fulfill the plurality requirement. A preexisting contractual relationship between
plaintiff and defendant is an especially common basis for meeting the jurisdictional requirement of
§ I in the case of antitrust disputes arising out of a distribution arrangement between the parties. If
a provision of the contract itself allegedly violates § 1, the plurality requirement is met without
question. See, eg., Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (location
clause in franchise agreement was the basis for a § 1 claim). If the § 1 claim is not based on an
express provision in plaintiff's and defendant's contract, other evidence is necessary to establish a
nexus between the challenged conduct and an agreement between defendant and plaintiff (or between
defendant and some other actor). See, eg., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (combina-
tion between newspaper company and carrier, forcing independent carrier to adhere to maximum
price, was illegal restraint of trade under § I of Sherman Act). When a private antitrust claim is
based on a contractual arrangement between a plaintiff and a defendant, the plaintiff's claim is not
barred because of its participation in the arrangement as a whole or in the particular conduct being
questioned; the defendant may not assert in pari delicto as a defense in a private antitrust action.
Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
8. See, eg., Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
9. See, e.g., Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963).
10. See, eg., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
11. See, eg., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltime Research, 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (patent license);
Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Sigma Sys. Corp., 500 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1974) (trade secret license).
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disputes that might subsequently arise under the agreement, the policies favoring
arbitration and private antitrust enforcement create perplexing crosscurrents.
Because private antitrust actions vindicate public as well as private concerns,
antitrust policy has always presupposed the use of litigation rather than an ex-
trajudicial tribunal. Courts confronted with the conflict between arbitration and
antitrust policy have unanimously concluded that arbitration clauses are not
binding insofar as private antitrust claims are concerned and, consequently, that
arbitration of such claims cannot be compelled. 12
This Article will examine the conceptual foundations of the fundamental
public policies favoring arbitration clauses and antitrust laws and critically ana-
lyze the rationales employed by courts in denying the arbitrability of antitrust
claims. A study will be made of the courts' efforts to accommodate the two
policies. Drawing upon this analysis of underlying rationales and accommoda-
tion efforts, the Article will evaluate the availability and efficacy of other meas-
ures for achieving greater accommodation.
I. THE POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
Today there exists in this country a strong public policy in favor of arbitra-
tion-the resolution of disputes by referral to one or more disinterested third
parties for binding determination. 13 There are many reasons for such a policy,
not the least of which are the well-publicized delay and expense associated with
formal litigation. 14 Available data confirm that arbitration normally is a faster
and less expensive means for settling controversies than litigation.' 5 Experience
12. See Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) % 66,296 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th
Cir. 1976); Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Cobb v. Lewis,
488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694
(6th Cir. 1972); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
949 (1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
872 (1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); Associated
Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co.
v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire &
Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Andriot v. Quickprint of Am., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 48
(S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983);
D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Janmort Leas-
ing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410
F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Black v.
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1975); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors
Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987
(1975).
13. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388
U.S. 395 (1967).
14. See 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 356-60 (1959); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68
A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Dombroff, Judicial Resolutions Not Always the Most Desirable, Legal Times of
Wash., Feb. 28, 1983, at 15, col. 1.
15. With respect to the relative speed of arbitration and litigation, see R. COULSON, BUSINESS
ARgrrRAToN-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 89 (1982); G. GOLDBERG, A LAWYER's GUIDE TO
COMMERCIAL ARBrrRATION Xi (2d ed. 1983); Ferguson, The Adjudication of Commercial Disputes
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has also taught that the adversary process of litigation often renders the continu-
ation of any productive relationship between the parties difficult and that a less
combative process such as arbitration is far less likely to destroy such a relation-
ship.16 Furthermore, because the arbitration process usually does not involve a
substantially greater investment of time and money than a settlement negotia-
tion,17 a relatively small percentage of disputes submitted to arbitration are set-
tled prior to a final arbitral determination.18 On the other hand, a large
percentage of disputes in litigation are settled prior to a final judicial determina-
tion, often virtually on the steps of the courthouse after countless hours and
many thousands of dollars have been spent during pretrial preparation.1 9 Thus,
arbitration produces a significantly higher ratio of actual adjudications per unit
of resource expenditure.
20
Despite the strength and clarity of the modem policy favoring arbitration,
the traditional common-law disposition toward this type of extrajudicial dispute
resolution procedure was anything but favorable. Before examining in detail the
legislative expression of current policy, it is instructive to consider the historical
contexts of societal and governmental sentiments toward arbitration.
A. Early History of Arbitration
The use of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism is of ancient ori-
gin.2 1 Although often viewed as innovative, arbitration actually antedates the
and the Legal System in Modern England, 7 BIrT. J. LAw & Soc'Y 141 (1980); Mentschikoff, Com-
mercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 850 (1961).
On the question of relative costs, see AMERICAN MANAGEMENT Ass'N, RESOLVING BUSINESS
DisPUrEs 127-33 (1965) [hereinafter cited as A.M.A.]; ARBIrrRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES,
INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS 6-7 (A. Widiss ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ARBrrRATON:
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES]; Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative.: A Comparative Analysis
of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and the
Courts, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 6 (1983). Most authorities have viewed the lower cost of arbitration as a
given. A.M.A., supra, at 127-33; ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra, at 6-7. Com-
ments by those who actually have submitted commercial disputes to arbitration substantiate the cost
savings feature of that dispute resolution mechanism. See, eg., Janicke & Borovoy, Resolving Patent
Disputes by Arbitration: An Alternative to Litigation, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 337 (1980). However,
one finding by Kritzer and Anderson indicates that arbitrating a dispute through the American
Arbitration Association is not always less expensive than litigation, primarily because arbitration is
so much more likely to proceed to an adjudicated conclusion than is litigation. Kritzer & Anderson,
supra, at 18-19. It should be noted that Kritzer and Anderson's cost study took into account only
attorney fees, which previous research had shown to comprise the bulk of costs associated with
dispute resolution. Id. at 7. A complete comparison of arbitration and litigation costs would include
an assessment of other types of costs not measured by Kritzer and Anderson.
16. See Burger, supra note 14, at 275; Janicke & Borovoy, supra note 15, at 339.
17. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 15, at 11.
18. See Janicke & Borovoy, supra note 15, at 358.
19. Withrow & Larm, The "Big"Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 1, 5 (1976).
20. Kritzer & Anderson, supra note 15, at 17-19.
21. For a view of arbitration in its historical context, see F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRA-
TION: ITS HISTORY, FuNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS (1948); Emerson, History of Arbitration
Practice and Law, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 155 (1970); Sayre, Development of CommercialArbitration
Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1927); and Wolaver, The Historical Background of CommercialArbitration,
83 U. PA. L. REv. 132 (1934).
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formal judiciary by centuries.22 It is found in Old Testament scripture23 and in
Greek mythology. 24 Arbitration enjoyed some popularity in the settlement of
political disputes in the first millenium B.C. Controversies between Athens and
Megara over possession of the island of Salamis in about 600 B.C., between Co-
rinth and Corcyra over possession of Leucas in 480 B.C., and between Genoa
and the Viturians over a common boundary in 117 B.C. were all settled by arbi-
tration.25 Evidence also exists that various employment disputes in ancient
times were frequently arbitrated.26 Of more particular relevance to the present
discussion, the arbitration of commercial disputes was demonstrably common-
place through the centuries in many different civilizations. It was common
among traders from the Phoenicians and Greeks to the desert caravans of Marco
Polo's time.
27
With the notable exception of the English common law, the development of
formal legal systems and professional judiciaries normally did not produce sig-
nificant hostility toward arbitration.28 Roman law recognized the validity of
arbitration agreements and provided rules for their enforcement. 29 This recep-
tive attitude carried over to the civil law and to continental procedural codes.
30
The posture of the English, however, was altogether different, and com-
mon-law courts very early exhibited a repugnance to nonjudicial forums.3' Ar-
bitration agreements were said to contravene public policy because they ousted
the courts of jurisdiction.32 The origin of the rule against arbitration can be
traced at least as far back as the fifteenth century, to four cases holding arbitra-
tion agreements revocable.33 The rule apparently was given additional strength
by Lord Coke's dictum in Vynior's Case34 in 1609: "[I]f I submit myself to an
arbitriment. . . yet I may revoke it for my act, or my words cannot alter the
judgment of the law to make that irrevocable which is of its own nature revoca-
ble."' 35 In later years Coke's statement took on an identity and vitality of its
22. F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 3-6; Emerson, supra note 21, at 155-57; Sayre, supra note 21,
at 598; Wolaver, supra note 21, at 132-38.
23. 1 Kings 3:16-28.
24. F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 3; Emerson, supra note 21, at 156.
25. F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 4; Emerson, supra note 21, at 156
26. F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 4; Emerson, supra note 21, at 156.
27. F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 3; Emerson, supra note 21, at 156.
28. P. PouND, supra note 14, at 356-60.
29. Id. at 360.
30. Id. The official attitude toward arbitration in France, however, could be characterized as
relatively hostile until 1806. Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its
Remedial and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J 33, 53 (1984).
31. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, BAsic CONTRACr LAW 432-33 (3d ed. 1972); R. POUND,
supra note 14, at 357-58; Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 40-44; Sayre, supra note 21, at 596-605;
Wolaver, supra note 21, at 138-46.
32. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra note 31, at 432-33; R. PoUND, supra note 14, at 357-
58; Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 40-44; Sayre, supra note 21, at 596-605; Wolaver, supra note 21,
at 138-46.
33. Y.B. Mich. 8 Edw. 4, f. 9b, 10a, pl. 9 (1468); Y.B. Trin. 5 Edw. 4, f. 3b, pl. 2 (1465); Y.B.
Pasch. 28 Hen. 6, f. 6, pl. 4 (1449); Y.B. Hil. 21 Hen. 6, f. 30a, pl. 14 (1442).
34. 8 Co. 80a, 81b (1609).
35. Id. at 81b.
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own, apart from the context in which it arose.36
Although the precise reasons for the development of a common-law bias
against arbitration are obscure, it is possible to understand better the English
experience with arbitration by considering the common-law judiciary in its his-
torical context. In 1856 Lord Campbell speculated that the rule against ar-
bitration agreements probably originated with English judges' almost total
dependence on fees from cases for income.37 Another contributing factor might
have been the centuries-long struggle of the early law courts for jurisdiction.
After the Norman conquest in 1066, the hundred, shire, manorial, and borough
courts of Anglo-Saxon origin continued to function along with the newer king's
courts constituted by the Normans. 38 This latter system of courts, from which
the common-law system evolved, competed for jurisdiction with the shire courts
for two hundred years and with the manorial and borough courts for seven hun-
dred years.39 Moreover, in the fifteenth century, by which time the common-
law courts and their system of law had become highly developed and relatively
secure, these courts faced another and far more significant jurisdictional chal-
lenge from the Chancery, a challenge that would continue for four hundred
years.4
°
The efforts of the bar to institutionalize the legal profession might also have
contributed to the common-law bias against extrajudicial dispute resolution.
41
The success of any group in its attempts to professionalize depends partly on
how well the group can differentiate its expertise. This differentiation contains
elements of both substance and illusion. In the community of common-law
practitioners, there was substance-more and more specialized knowledge be-
came necessary to practice law competently as the years passed.42 There also
was the appearance of differentiation. Part of this aura of specialized expertise
was the body of procedure woven into the litigation process. Regardless of how
useful these litigation procedures might have been at the time they were
adopted, they probably contributed to the common-law attitude toward arbitra-
tion by creating disincentives within the developing legal profession to en-
courage the use of extrajudicial forums. No body of technical procedure
attached to the resolution of disputes through arbitration or other means of self-
help; thus, there was a danger that such nontechnical methods would become
36. Wolaver, supra note 21, at 138-43.
37. In earlier times judges had not been paid salaries. Scott v. Avery, 5. H.L. Cas. 811, 853, 10
Eng. Rep. 1121, 1138 (1856). As recorded in another reporter, Lord Campell said that "the emolu-
ments of the Judges depended mainly, or almost entirely, upon fees, and as they had no fixed salary
there was great competition to get as much as possible of litigation into Westminister Hall." 25 L.J.
(n.s.) 313 (Ex. 1856).
38. See generally F. KEMPIN, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW, 23-29
(2d ed. 1973) (outlining the judicial system in England after the Norman conquest).
39. See id. at 24, 27.
40. See generally id. at 36-40 (outlining the rise of courts of equity).
41. It has been observed that the bar has traditionally exhibited a degree of antagonism toward
arbitration. See, eg., A.M.A., supra note 15, at 20; Burger, supra note 14, at 277; Dobkin, Arbi-
trability of Patent Disputes Under the U.S. Arbitration Act, 23 ARB. J. 2-3 (1968).




popular and alter the public's perceptions about the need for professional
assistance.
With such a background, it is natural that the common law looked upon
agreements to arbitrate with suspicion. This suspicion led to the rule that agree-
ments to submit future disputes to arbitration were unenforceable. 43 Even if the
parties adhered to the arbitration agreement voluntarily, the arbitrator's award
was subject to thorough judicial review.4 4 Ultimately the common law took the
view that an agreement to submit a specific, existing dispute to arbitration was
enforceable, but the rule against enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future
disputes remained inviolate until it was changed by legislation.4 5 The rule
against enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes came to America
with the common law4 6 and, according to one commentator, might have been
fueled even further by unique characteristics of this country.
It is probable that [the nonacceptance of arbitration] was due some-
what to the attitude of Americans toward discord and dispute. They
were complacently accepted phenomena, to be settled by force or by
litigation, if need be. America was a rich country, full of adventure
and could afford a considerable volume of disputes at a high cost of
settlement. As disputes were regarded as an inevitable and healthful
process in the development of a new country, the prospect that they
might sometime become a menace to society was not of immediate
concern. Since in trade and commerce the margin of profit was then
sufficient to allow for a very considerable waste, the attribute of econ-
omy was not an attraction to arbitration ...
It is also probable that this early American attitude toward dis-
putes... failed to give arbitration any outstanding advocates. With-
out such leadership, so conspicuous in other advancing fields of
endeavor, arbitration could not present an effective challenge to the
fast-growing volume of disputes.47
B. The Movement Toward More Favorable Treatment
of Arbitration Agreements
In both England and America the bias against arbitration was slow to
change. Nineteenth century legislation in England made future-disputes arbi-
tration agreements enforceable and attempted to provide a procedural structure
for judicial review of arbitration awards; however, this review continued to in-
volve a thorough examination on the merits.48 Legislation in that country in the
mid-twentieth century again recognized the enforceability of agreements to sub-
43. See 6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNRAcrs § 1433 (1962); L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG,
supra note 31, at 432; R. POUND, supra note 14, at 358; Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 39 n.12;
Sayre, supra note 21, at 601; Wolaver, supra note 21, at 138.
44. Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 40-41.
45. See A. CORBIN, supra note 43, at § 1431 ("In the absence of statute to the contrary, no
agreement to arbitrate will be specifically enforced.").
46. See R. POUND, supra note 14, at 359; Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 39 n.12, 45.
47. F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 6-7.
48. Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 41; Sayre, supra note 21, at 606-08.
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mit future disputes to arbitration, but judicial review of awards remained com-
prehensive. 4 9 It was not until 1979 that England adopted legislation making the
modem policy in favor of arbitration a truly effective one. This legislation not
only recognized the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate existing and future
disputes; it also greatly limited the scope of judicial review.50
Almost all of the American states passed arbitration legislation during the
nineteenth century, but these statutes did little more than codify the common-
law attitude and outline procedures for review.51 In the twentieth century, how-
ever, dissatisfaction with juries as triers of fact in commercial litigation and long
delays due to congested court dockets led to dramatic changes in American sen-
timents toward arbitration.52 Frustration with the adjudicatory process, which
began early in the twentieth century and has continued to intensify, was well
capsulized recently by Chief Justice Burger:
We, as lawyers, know that litigation is not only stressful and frustrat-
ing but expensive and frequently unrewarding for litigants... .Com-
mercial litigation takes business executives and their staffs away from
the creative paths of development and production and often inflicts
more wear and tear on them than the most difficult business
problems.
53
In 1920 New York became the first state to enact a modem arbitration statute
providing for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future disputes and for
very limited judicial review of arbitrators' awards.5 4 In time, similar legislation
was enacted in the majority of other states, and in a few the same result was
reached by judicial rejection of the common-law rule.55
The most important development, however, was not the advent of state leg-
islation extending favorable treatment to arbitration agreements but the passage
of federal legislation in 1925.56 Because of its general importance and its cen-
trality to later analysis in this Article, a closer examination of the federal law is
warranted.
C. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
Responding to "a great demand for the correction of what seems to be an
49. Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 42-44.
50. Id. at 44-45.
51. L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra note 31, at 433; Sayre, supra note 21, at 612-13.
52. R. POUND, supra note 14, at 359.
53. Burger, supra note 14, at 275.
54. Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, cited in L. FULLER & M. EISENBERO,
supra note 31, at 433.
55. G. GOLDBERG, supra note 15, at 6-7.
56. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9
U.S.C §§ 1-14 (1982)). The formation of the American Arbitration Association in New York in
1926 was probably the second most important development because the Association was the first
effective, organized advocate of arbitration as a desirable dispute resolution mechanism. The Associ-
ation ultimately created a recognized set of procedures for selecting arbitrators and conducting arbi-
tration hearings. See F. KELLOR, supra note 21, at 15-33.
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anachronism in our law," T5 7 Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925.58 At the core of the Act is section 2, which provides that in a maritime
transaction or in a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate com-
merce, a written provision calling for arbitration of either an existing dispute or
any future dispute arising out of the transaction is "valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable."'5 9 The Act has come to occupy a paramount place in the American
process of dispute resolution for three reasons. First, liberality in the interpreta-
tion of the Constitution's commerce clause has given the Act the same broad
applicability as other commerce clause-based statutes. 6° Second, the Act has
been interpreted as an expression of substantive law, not just as an alteration of
procedure, 61 with the result that it displaces any conflicting state law under the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. 62 Third, the Act has been held applicable
even if the parties have agreed that state law will apply.
63
The Arbitration Act goes far beyond merely validating arbitration clauses
and in several ways mandates the active involvement of federal courts in imple-
menting the Act's pro-arbitration policy. When a valid arbitration agreement
exists, a federal district court is required to stay litigation on any issue that is
57. 65 CONG. REc. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
58. Pub. L. No. 401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982)).
59. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). The text of § 2 is as follows:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
Id.
60. For cases interpreting the commerce clause expansively, see, eg., Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967) (consulting agreement to cbtain assistance in
moving business from New Jersey to Maryland and continuing operations of an interstate manufac-
turing and wholesaling business are clearly interstate commerce); Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v.
Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir.) (employers and materials used in business cross
state lines even though work was to be done within one state), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 817 (1961); see
also Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. The Steamship Mihalis Angelos, 234 F. Supp. 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (maritime jurisdiction construed broadly).
61. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
62. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S. Ct. 852, 858 (1984). In Southland the Court held that
the Federal Arbitration Act prevailed over a provision of the California Franchise Investment Law,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (West 1977), that prohibited waiver of rights. The waiver of rights
provision could not be applied to preclude arbitration.
It should be noted, however, that the characterization of the Federal Arbitration Act as sub-
stantive law also means that state law will be applied by a federal court if the federal law is found
inapplicable for some reason. Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts are
required to apply federal procedural law, but in the absence of controlling federal substantive law,
they must apply state substantive law. Thus, the result that occurred in Southland can occur only
when the jurisdictional prerequisites of the Federal Arbitration Act are present, that is, when
(a) there is a transaction involving either interstate commerce or maritime trade, and (b) there is a
written agreement to arbitrate. For example, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198,
202 (1956), interstate commerce was not involved, and, consequently, state arbitration law applied
because the Federal Arbitration Act is substantive federal law.
63. Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 952 (1976); Metro Indus. Parking Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1961);
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362
U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960).
1986]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
within the scope of the arbitration clause" and, upon application by either
party, must issue a decree compelling arbitration.65 Moreover, when a valid
arbitration agreement is in force but an arbitrator has not been selected, the
district court is required to appoint an arbitrator upon application by either
party.66 The Act provides arbitrators complete subpoena powers for evidence-
gathering purposes; in the event of noncompliance with an arbitrator's sub-
poena, the district court may issue an order compelling compliance or hold the
noncomplying party in contempt without benefit of a prior compliance order.
67
If the parties have so agreed, either party may obtain an order of the district
64. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). The text of § 3 is as follows:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any
issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court
in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
65. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). The text of § 4 is as follows:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court
which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or
in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the
party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that
the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in
issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in ac-
cordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agree-
ment, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such
arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or
refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial
thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter
in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue.
Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of
admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of
such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an order referring the issue or
issues to a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may
specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in writing for
arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding
shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing
and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summa-
rily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms
thereof.
Id.
66. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (1982). The text of § 5 is as follows:
If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbi-
trator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be
provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail him-
self of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an
arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of
either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbi-
trators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the
same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein; and unless other-
wise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
Id.
67. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). The text of § 7 is as follows:
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court confirming the award and reducing it to judgment for up to one year fol-
lowing entry of the arbitrator's award.
68
The Act makes it clear that judicial involvement in the merits of the dispute
is to be almost nonexistent. Section 2 provides that arbitration provisions are
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." 69 Although this qualification of the
validity of arbitration agreements incorporates all the common-law contract de-
fenses such as fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence, and illegality, the federal
courts have given a pro-arbitral interpretation to this proviso so that issues such
as fraud or illegality are for the arbitrator to decide unless the issues relate spe-
cifically to the arbitration clause. In other words, such defenses to the enforce-
ability of the contract as a whole are within the purview of the commercial
arbitration process. These defenses are beyond the arbitrator's authority and,
consequently, are decided by the court only when the assertion is that the arbi-
tration clause itself was induced by fraud, tainted by illegality, or otherwise ren-
dered invalid.
70
A further demonstration of the congressional desire for judicial noninvolve-
ment in the merits of an arbitrable dispute is found in section 10, which provides
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a majority of
them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a wit-
ness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case. The fees for such attendance shall
be the same as the fees of witnesses before masters of the United States courts. Said sum-
mons shall issue in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them, and
shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be directed to the said
person and shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before
the court; if any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey
said summons, upon petition the United States district court for the district in which such
arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such person or
persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or persons for contempt
in the same manner provided by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their pun-
ishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States.
Id.
68. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). The text of § 9 is as follows:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then
at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply
to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must
grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in
sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties then
such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within
which such award was made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse
party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had
appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the district
within which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or
his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same
court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be
served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse party may be found in like
manner as other process of the court.
Id.
69. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
70. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
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that an arbitration award may be set aside by a court only on specific grounds
unrelated to the substantive merits:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
7 1
Even if an arbitration award is set aside on any of these grounds, the Act speci-
fies that the court may direct a rehearing by the arbitrator.72 This "second
chance" further reflects a congressional desire to honor the arbitration process
to the fullest extent possible without sacrificing fundamental fairness. The Act
apparently does not contemplate a judicial ruling on the merits even when an
award is vacated.
73
Federal courts have also implemented the legislative intent to promote
commercial arbitration by giving expansive interpretations to arbitration clauses
when determining whether the party seeking arbitration has asserted a claim
within the scope of the clause.74 In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mer-
cury Construction Co.75 the Supreme Court stated that "any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether
the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of... a... defense to arbitrability."' 76 An examination of the cases
has led one commentator to observe that "a particular dispute will be arbitrable
unless the arbitration agreement cannot be rationally interpreted to cover it.""
7
71. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). In addition, § Il of the Act, 9 U.S.C. § 11 (1982), provides for
judicial modification of the arbitrator's award in the following circumstances:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident mate-
rial mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, unless it
is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy.
72. 9 U.S.C. § 10(e) (1982). The text of § 10(e) is as follows:
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the
award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the
arbitrators.
Id.
73. See Carbonneau, supra note 30, at 48 n.56.
74. See, eg., Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 412 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960); Jannort Leasing, Inc. v.
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
75. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
76. Id. at 24-25.
77. Krause, Securities Litigation: The Unsolved Problem of Predispute Arbitration Agreements
for Pendent Claims, 29 DEPAUL L. REv. 693, 699 (1980).
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From the language of the statute and from the judicial implementation of the
statutory provisions, it is evident that the American position in favor of com-
mercial arbitration is among the strongest and most clearly expressed public
policies of this century.
II. THE POLICY FAVORING PRIvATE ENFORCEMENT
OF THE ANTITRUsT LAWS
The antitrust laws, which seek to promote competitive markets by outlaw-
ing various anticompetitive practices, are at the very heart of government eco-
nomic policy.78 The Sherman Act,7 9 which was the first and is still the most
fundamental antitrust statute, has been judicially characterized as a "charter of
freedom" possessing an almost constitutional status.80 Similar views of anti-
trust's place in American law have been expressed time and again by the
Supreme Court. The words of Justice Black in Northern Pacific Railway Co. v.
United States 81 are representative:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition
as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained inter-
action of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our eco-
nomic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social
institutions.
82
Private enforcement has been a cornerstone of antitrust policy since its in-
ception.8 3 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "any person injured in his
business or property" by a violation of the antitrust laws may sue and recover
threefold damages.84 Section 16 of the Clayton Act permits a suit for injunctive
relief by an injured private party.85 In addition, in either a treble damage or
injunctive suit, a successful plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and
costs. 86 Adding to these private enforcement incentives are the Clayton Act
provisions allowing liberal venue selection8 7 and use of findings from prior Jus-
tice Department civil or criminal cases as prima facie evidence of liability in
78. See generally, L. SULLiVAN, supra note 5, § 1 (discussing importance of economic objec-
tives in antitrust law).
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1982).
80. Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936) (provisions in Sherman Act are
broad and are interpreted like a constitution).
81. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
82. Id. at 4.
83. The original § 7 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890), provided for the recovery
of treble damages, costs, and attorney fees by a private party injured as a result of a violation of the
antitrust laws. This provision was later superseded by § 4 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731
(1914), and was ultimately repealed in 1955 by Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
85. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1982).
86. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1982).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
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private antitrust suits.88
The treble damage remedy provides a powerful incentive for private en-
forcement. Indeed, Congress intended such an effect when it created the rem-
edy. Recognizing that government enforcement would be perpetually hampered
by limited resources, necessarily selective, and not likely to be concerned with
local or less than flagrant offenses, Congress created the treble damage remedy
to increase the incidence of enforcement actions.8 9 The resulting large number
of "private attorneys general" greatly increases the probability that a given vio-
lation will be detected. These greater odds of detection, when coupled with the
enlarged cost to those found liable, enhance the deterrent effect of antitrust
laws.90
III. Am3rRATION OF PluVATE ANTrIRUST CLAiS-THE
POLICIES IN CONFLICT
It is relatively common to find a preexisting contractual relationship be-
tween the parties to a private antitrust dispute.9 1 In conjunction with antitrust
issues, such a dispute often involves nonantitrust issues such as fraud,92 breach
of contract, 93 breach of warranty, 94 patent infringement, 95 misappropriation of
trade secrets or other unpatented know-how,9 6 tortious interference with con-
tract,97 breach of fiduciary duty,98 duress,99 unconscionability,l0° or mistake.10 1
When the parties' contract includes a clause providing for the arbitration of fu-
ture disputes, some interesting questions arise. Because of the paramount impor-
tance of antitrust law to national economic policy, even private antitrust
disputes are not purely private but are semipublic in character. 1 2 The question
naturally arises, therefore, whether antitrust policy can be properly recognized
and protected when antitrust questions are submitted to a privately selected ar-
bitrator rather than to a federal court.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
89. See, eg., P. AREEDA, ANTITRusr ANALYSIS § 159 (3d ed. 1981).
90. Id. It should be noted that although many of the cases dealing with arbitration of antitrust
claims have involved requests by the antitrust claimant for either injunctive relief or declaratory
judgment of contract invalidity rather than treble damages, the courts have made no distinction
based on the remedy sought and have lumped all private antitrust enforcement actions together
when discussing the arbitrability question.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 7-11.
92. See, eg., Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
93. See, e-g., Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976).
94. See, eg., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
95. See, eg., N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1976).
96. See, e.g., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
97. See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th
Cir. 1978).
98. See, e-g., Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983).




102. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir. 1968).
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A. Emergence of the Public Interest Rule
Antitrust claims are not the only claims that raise issues of public interest in
the course of private disputes. The question whether private claims affecting the
public interest are arbitrable first arose in the securities context. In Wilko v.
Swan 10 3 a customer sued a brokerage firm under section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933104 for allegedly misrepresenting and omitting material facts in con-
nection with a sale of stock. Defendant sought an order staying the litigation
and compelling arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause in plaintiff's
margin agreement with defendant.105 The district court denied the stay, con-
cluding that arbitration of the Securities Act claim could not be compelled. 106
A divided court of appeals reversed and held that arbitration was required. 10 7
Agreeing with the district court's resolution of the policy conflict, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals decision.' 0 8 Contrary to the normal judicial
attitude toward arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court con-
cluded that the arbitration agreement was not binding in this particular dis-
pute.109 The Court's conclusion was based on section 14 of the Securities Act,
which specifies that any provision, stipulation, or condition binding a person
acquiring a security to waive compliance with any provision of that Act is
void.110 The Court viewed the right to bring suit in federal district court as a
provision of the Securities Act that could not be waived.'1 1 The waiver prohibi-
tion of section 14 has produced the same result in disputes involving other sec-
tions of the Securities Act.'
1 2
Although the development of a nonarbitrability rule for securities claims
was based on a specific statutory prohibition of waiver, the rule was actually a
broadly based product of the public interest nature of the securities laws. Such a
conclusion is apparent from the reasons asserted for construing the waiver pro-
hibition to extend to a waiver of the right to litigate. In Wilko the Court empha-
103. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
105. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429.
106. Wilko v. Swan, 107 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
107. WV*ko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (1953).
108. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
109. Id.
110. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982).
111. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427.
112. For example, courts have held that the right to litigate claims under § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e
(1982), which deals with registration requirements, cannot be waived and that such claims thus are
not arbitrable. See, e-g., Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974); Maheu v.
Reynolds & Co., 282 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The same result has been reached under § 17,
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982), which deals with fraud. See eg., Davend Corp. v. Michael, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,540 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Frier Indus. v. Glickman,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) % 94,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Moreover, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains a provision similar to § 14 of the Securities Act of 1933.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). Consequently, claims
based on the 1934 Act have also been held nonarbitrable. See eg., Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch,
Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Laupheimer v. McDonnell & Co., 500 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1974);
Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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sized that the stated policy of the Securities Act was to protect investors1 13 and
that, in furtherance of this policy, the Act created "special right[s]" more pro-
tective than those at common law.114 In Wilko and in subsequent cases, the
right to sue in federal court was characterized as a nonwaivable "special right";
because the investor has such a wide choice of venue in securities litigation,
nationwide service of process is available to the plaintiff, and the investor proba-
bly is unable "to judge the weight of the handicap the Securities Act places upon
his adversary" at the time future-dispute arbitration agreements are made. 15 In
the end, the conclusion that securities claims are nonarbitrable is clearly
grounded in a judicial perception that the investor-protection policy underlying
the securities laws simply cannot be policed adequately in the arbitration
process. 11
6
The rule that private claims imbued with a public interest are not arbitrable
has also been applied to questions concerning the validity of patents. Although
a recent amendment to the patent code rendered patent-validity issues arbitra-
ble," 7 the courts previously had consistently treated such questions as beyond
the purview of the arbitration process.118 In a similar vein, claims brought
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 19 have
been held nonarbitrable.' 20 In another area, there is considerable conflict
among federal courts on the question whether claims related to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings are arbitrable or whether the public interest aspects of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code' 2 ' require implied repeal of the Arbitration Act.
122
113. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 434-38.
116. See Krause, supra note 77, at 704-05; Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An
Examination the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARwozo L. REv. 481, 516-21 (1981).
117. 35 U.S.C. § 294 (1982). Although this amendment renders patent-validity questions arbi-
trable, the arbitrator's award on such issues is effective only between the parties and does not have
the effect on third parties of a judicial declaration regarding patent validity. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c).
118. See, eg., N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1976); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Diematic Mfg. Corp. v.
Packaging Indus., 381 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975). See generally Carmichael, Arbitration of Patent Disputes, 38 AR. J. 3
(1983) (analyzing the new patent arbitration legislation in light of the history of patent disputes);
Dobkin, Arbitrability of Patent Disputes Under the US. Arbitration Act, 23 ARB. J. 1 (1968) (com-
patability of arbitration and patent disputes); Janicke & Borovoy, supra note 15 (discussing arbitra-
tion of patent disputes in actual practice); Sterk, supra note 116, at 512-16 (discussing courts'
holdings prior to patent arbitration legislation); Timberg, Antitrust Aspects of Patent Litigation, Arbi-
tration and Settlement, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 244 (1977) (questioning why patent arbitration is not
generally accepted in light of the strong public policy favoring arbitration of commercial disputes).
119. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982).
120. See S.A. Mineracao Da Trindade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
121. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982).
122. See Zimmerman v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 712 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104
S. Ct. 699 (1984); Coar v. Brown, 29 Bankr. 806 (N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 33
Bankr. 33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983); In re Good Hope Indus., 16 Bankr. 719 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982)
(refusing to compel arbitration when bankruptcy issues are present); see also In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co.,
711 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1983) (if court finds agreement to arbitrate, court will order arbitration
despite bankruptcy issues); In re Morgan, 28 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (court enforced arbitra-
tion agreement, holding that when a debtor brings suit against a party who has made no claim on the
estate, there is no competing "bankruptcy policy"); In re Cres Rivera Concrete Co., 21 Bankr. 155
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (discussing the controversial application of arbitration agreements to bank-
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B. Application of The Public Interest Rule to Antitrust Claims1 23
The arbitrability of public interest issues arising in an antitrust context was
first confronted directly in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. .P. Maguire &
Co.12 4 In that case Hickok Manufacturing Company, a maker of men's belts,
apparel, and gift items, licensed its Hickok trademark to American Safety
Equipment Corporation (ASE) for use in connection with ASE's manufacture
and sale of seat belts and other automotive safety devices. 125 The license in-
cluded a provision by which each party agreed not to encroach on the other's
product line, as well as a clause requiring arbitration of all disputes arising out of
or relating to the license agreement. 126 After the parties experienced several
profitable years of operation under the license, their relationship deteriorated. 127
ASE filed suit against Hickok, asserting the invalidity of the license on the
ground that the product line restriction violated the Sherman Act. 128 In re-
sponse, Hickok and Maguire, the assignee of Hickok's royalty rights, asserted a
claim for royalties due and demanded arbitration. 129 The district court stayed
the litigation and ordered arbitration of all issues.
130
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit char-
acterized the issue as whether "the statutory right ASE seeks to enforce is 'of a
ruptcy disputes). See generally Deitrick, The Conflicting Policies Between Arbitration and Bank-
ruptcy, 40 Bus. LAW. 33 (1984) (analysis of conflicts between Arbitration Act and Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978).
123. Although courts of appeals for six of the eleven circuits have held antitrust claims to be
nonarbitrable, infra notes 124-38 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court has not confronted the
issue directly. The Court, however, has dealt with the arbitrability question in an international
context. At the close of its 1984-85 term, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985), the Court held that private antitrust claims are arbitrable in a
transaction arising in international commerce. The Court's holding in Mitsubishi followed its
decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), which had held the Wilko rule of
nonarbitrability for securities claims inapplicable in an international transaction.
Because there are important additional policy considerations to be weighed in determining the
arbitrability question in an international context, and because the question of domestic arbitrability
was not presented, the Court in Mitsubishi expressly did not rule on the arbitrability of antitrust
claims in the domestic context. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355. Consequently, the Mitsubishi holding
does not affect the analysis in this Article, except insofar as the Court in that case cast doubt on some
of the rationales that had been employed to deny arbitrability to domestic antitrust claims.
124. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). Although American Safety was the first case that directly
confronted the question in a commercial arbitration context, several previous federal court decisions
had touched peripherally on the issue in a labor arbitration setting. In Silvercup Bakers, Inc. v. Fink
Baking Corp., 273 F. Supp. 159, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), the court in dictum characterized as
"persuasive" the view that courts should not be displaced by labor arbitrators in deciding antitrust
suits. A similar view had been expressed earlier in Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 107 F. Supp. 532, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Another earlier case, Greenstein v. National Skirt &
Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1960),
took an arguably contrary view by refusing to stay arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment even though plaintiff claimed, among other things, that provisions of the agreement violated
the antitrust laws.
125. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 822.




130. Id. at 823-24.
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character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration.' "131 Concluding that
antitrust claims are not appropriate for enforcement by arbitration, the court
stated:
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter.
The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in a
competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the
Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the
public's interest. . . . Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of
thousands-perhaps millions-of people and inflict staggering eco-
nomic damage. . . . We do not suggest that all antitrust litigations
attain these swollen proportions. . . . But in fashioning a rule to gov-
ern the arbitrability of antitrust claims, we must consider the rule's
potential effect. For the same reason, it is also proper to ask whether
contracts of adhesion between alleged monopolists and their customers
should determine the forum for trying antitrust violations. Here again,
we think that Congress would hardly have intended that ...
[I]n addition, the issues in antitrust cases are prone to be compli-
cated, and the evidence extensive and diverse, far better suited to judi-
cial than to arbitration procedures. Moreover, it is the business
community generally that is regulated by the antitrust laws. Since
commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for their business ex-
pertise, it hardly seems proper for them to determine these issues of
great public interest.
13 2
The Second Circuit has reiterated its holding that arbitration of antitrust
claims may not be compelled;13 3 and that holding has been adopted by the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth,
134 Sixth, 135 Seventh, 136
Eighth,13 7 and Ninth138 Circuits. Claims under state antitrust laws have simi-
131. Id. at 825 (quoting its own opinion in Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439,444 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346
U.S. 427 (1953)).
132. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-27.
133. See Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 66,296 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
134. Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976); Cobb v. Lewis,
488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
135. Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972).
136. Applied Digital Tech., Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978);
Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970).
137. Helfenbein v. International Indus., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 872
(1971).
138. Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); see Varo v.
Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto
Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
There are also a number of district court decisions applying the rule. See, eg., Janmort Leasing,
Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
410 F. Supp. 10, 25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977);
Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 519
F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental
Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Andriot v. Quickprint of Am.,
Inc., 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp.
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larly been held nonarbitrable. 139 The rule against arbitration of antitrust claims
has been qualified by only one exception. Courts have held that such claims may
be arbitrated if the agreement to arbitrate was made after the dispute arose.
The reasoning behind the exception is that the arbitration agreement in such a
case is nothing more than a particular vehicle for settlement and that the law
generally favors settlements1 4 1 even in disputes to which the public interest
attaches.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American
Safety employed four basic rationales in reaching its conclusion that antitrust
claims are not subject to arbitration: (1) arbitration proceedings inadequately
protect the public interest; (2) the contract containing the arbitration clause is
likely to be a contract of adhesion; (3) antitrust claims are evidentially complex;
and (4) arbitrators lack suficient expertise to decide antitrust claims. 142 Other
courts, 143 as well as several commentators, 144 have since expanded the list to
include a host of other rationales, the most clearly identifiable of which are the
following: (5) antitrust claims should be viewed as beyond the scope of the arbi-
tration clause; 145 (6) the arbitration process possesses an anonymity and confi-
dentiality unsuited to the protection of such important rights because arbitrators
1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Taylor v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Black v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1975)
139. See, ag., Aimcee Wholesale Corp. v. Tomar Prods., Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 621, 237 N.E.2d 223,
289 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1968).
140. Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d
1209 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
141. Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41,49 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d
1209, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972).
142. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826-27.
143. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,296 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.,
576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp.,
532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1976); Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Cobb v. Lewis, 488
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th
Cir. 1972); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 406 U.S. 949
(1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872
(1971); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); Associated
Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970); A. & E. Plastik
Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); NPS Communications, Inc. v. The Conti-
nental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Andriot v. Quickprint of
Am., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F.
Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983); D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979);
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 984 (1977); Black v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1975); Overseas
Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
144. See Farber, The Antitrust Claimant and Compulsory Arbitration Clauses, 28 FED. B.J. 90
(1968); Loevinger, Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085 (1969); Pitof-
sky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. RaV. 1072 (1969); Sterk, supra note 116,
at 503-11; Timberg, supra note 118, at 244-45 (1977); Comment, Private Arbitration and Antitrust
Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 406 (1969). But see Aksen,
Arbitration and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1097 (1969) (the only previous
expression of significant disagreement with the rule of nonarbitrability).
145. See, eg., Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1090.
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usually are not required to follow precisely the governing legal principles, pub-
lish findings, or give reasons for a decision; 146 (7) the lack of judicial review
precludes the development of precedent to guide the legal and business commu-
nities; 147 (8) the antitrust plaintiff is deprived of important statutory rights in
arbitration proceedings, such as the rights to treble damages, attorney fees, and
liberal forum selection;148 (9) an arbitrator is unlikely to give adequate effect to a
prior judicial decree in a government antitrust suit based on the same facts;
149
(10) contrary to the normally extensive evidentiary production process of anti-
trust litigation, arbitration proceedings are characterized by meager fact gather-
ing; 150 and (11) arbitrators are more likely to give weight to equitable
considerations that would be impermissible in litigation. 15 ' Several of these ar-
guments shade substantially into one another and therefore warrant consoli-
dated analysis.
IV. RATIONALES FOR THE NONARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS
A. Scope of the Arbitration Clause
When interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act,15 2 the courts have made it
clear that the duty to arbitrate is purely a creature of agreement and that no one
may be compelled to arbitrate a claim outside the scope of that agreement.
15 3
Some commentators have observed that the parties to an average predispute ar-
bitration agreement are not likely to have foreseen an antitrust dispute or to
have intended to include antitrust claims within the scope of the arbitration
clause.15 4 No court, however, has based its decision not to compel arbitration of
antitrust claims on a lack of specific contractual intent; the decisions have
146. See, eg., id. at 1091; Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1076-77; Comment, supra note 144, at
416.
147. See, eg., Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1076-77; Comment, supra note 144, at 412.
148. See eg., Farber, supra note 144, at 92-93; Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1078-79; Comment,
supra note 144, at 415.
149. See eg., Farber, supra note 144, at 93; Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1077-78; Comment,
supra note 144, at 416.
150. See, eg., Farber, supra note 144, at 94-95; Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1090-91; Pitofsky,
supra note 144, at 1080.
151. See eg., Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1091; Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1078; Comment,
supra note 144, at 417.
152. Federal Arbitration Act, §§ 2-3, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
153. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); ABIrrRATION:
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 15, at 127. The statement that the duty to arbitrate is purely a
creature of agreement must be qualified in those situations in which mandatory arbitration regimes
have been instituted. For example, some states have mandatory arbitration laws for relatively small
claims, and two federal districts have adopted rules requiring arbitration of relatively large claims.
See infra note 369 and accompanying text. When arbitration is mandatory rather than based on
agreement, it is by necessity either nonbinding or subject to full judicial review. See generally D.
HENSLER, A. LIFSON, & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE FIRST YEAR
(1981) (discussing the use of court-annexed arbitration in California); Levin, Court-AnnexedArbitra-
tion, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537 (1983) (discussing the use of court-annexed arbitration as an altena-
tive method of dispute resolution); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court Annexed Arbitration in the Federal
Court" The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REv. 787 (1983) (describing implementation characteris-
tics and successes of court-annexed arbitration program five years after implementation). See also
infra text accompanying notes 366-69 (summarizing use of court-annexed arbitration).
154. Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1090.
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clearly focused on other policy concerns.15 5
An excellent illustration is found in Power Replacements, In. v. Air Pre-
heater Co. 156 in which plaintiff, after an attempted market entry, sued the mar-
ket's dominant firm for alleged price discrimination and predatory pricing aimed
at eliminating plaintiff as a competitor. The settlement agreement reached by
the parties included a clause requiring arbitration of any other antitrust claims
occurring between the parties during the following two years. 15 7 When a similar
dispute arose in a different geographic locale within the two-year period and the
market entrant again filed an antitrust suit, defendant asserted the arbitration
agreement as a bar to the litigation.158 Because the agreement in question was a
future-disputes arbitration clause, the court held that the clause did not compel
arbitration of the antitrust claims.15 9 The clause, however, had dealt specifically
with anticipated antitrust claims; therefore, the court's decision was in direct
opposition to the parties' intent.
In addition to the courts' failure to pay attention to the question of contrac-
tual intent in ruling on the arbitrability of antitrust claims, the scope-of-clause
argument is faulty for at least two other reasons. First, most arbitration clauses
are extremely broad, often tracking the American Arbitration Association's sug-
gested language, which provides for submission of "[a]ny controversy or claim
arising out of or relating to" the underlying transaction. 16° In most cases in
which the antitrust arbitrability issue arises, the underlying transaction involves
a franchise, 16 1 a licensing agreement, 162 or some other arrangement' 63 that nor-
mally contemplates a business relationship of substantial duration and scope and
with recurrent contact between the parties. The use of general contractual lan-
155. See Aksen, supra note 144, at 1098-99.
156. 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970).
157. Id. at 981.
158. Id. at 982.
159. Id. at 984.
160. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASs'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (preamble) (1982).
161. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
1 66,296 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. :Eteco, 530 F.2d 679
(5th Cir. 1976); Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Cobb v.
Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffier v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466
F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1971); Andriot v. Quickprint of Am., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah
Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983); D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit
Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. I1. 1982); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l,
Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F.
Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
162. N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.
1976); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); NPS Communications, Inc. v. The
Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
163. Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978)
(sale of computer hardware plus development and maintenance of software, the latter aspect contem-
plating an ongoing relationship); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972) (relationship between members of New York Stock Exchange); Associ-
ated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Union Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1970) (collective
bargaining agreement between multiemployer bargaining unit and union); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (long-term sharing agreement among oil companies operating in
the Middle East), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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guage to describe the scope of a dispute-resolution mechanism in a relationship
characterized by continuity, breadth, and frequent interaction probably indi-
cates the parties' intent to include within that mechanism any dispute touching
on the relationship.
Second, arbitration clauses are interpreted with great liberality; general
clauses are normally construed to include claims such as fraud, 164 theft of trade
secrets, 165 trade disparagement, 166 defamation, 167 breach of fiduciary duty,
168
and negligence, 169 in addition to the obviously arbitrable claim for breach of
contract. Moreover, even when the arbitration clause is somewhat narrower
than the standard "arising out of or relating to" provision, it is given an expan-
sive construction. For example, in Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc.,170
a clause providing for mandatory arbitration of "[a]ll complaints, disputes or
grievances between the parties involving questions of interpretation of any of the
provisions of this Agreement ' 17 1 was found to encompass claims of fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty. Claims of this nature are not more foreseeable to the
contracting parties than antitrust claims.
B. Method of Decisionmaking and Lack of Review
Several closely related arguments against the arbitrability of antitrust
claims have centered on the methods by which the arbitrator reaches a decision
and the lack of external control over those methods. The essence of these argu-
ments is that certain methodological characteristics indigenous to the arbitration
process make it inevitably unsuitable for safeguarding the public interest attach-
ing to every private antitrust claim. Some commentators, for example, have em-
phasized that arbitrators normally are not required to produce written opinions
or to formulate detailed findings of fact.' 72 Consequently, the decisions of arbi-
trators do not add to the body of precedential literature necessary for the devel-
opment and refinement of antitrust legal theory, and both the legal and business
communities are partially deprived of essential guidance in an area of law in
which guidance is crucial. 173 Along similar lines, it has been observed that arbi-
trators are not required to follow pertinent legal rules precisely and that there is
little opportunity for judicial review. 174 As a result, it is argued, it is impossible
to determine whether an important public policy such as that embodied in the
164. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
165. Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. DeHart v. Moore, 424 F. Supp. 55 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
169. Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
170. 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
171. Id. at 1244.
172. See, ag., Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1076-77; Comment, supra note 144, at 413-16.
173. See, eg., Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1076-77; Comment, supra note 144, at 412.
174. See, eg., Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1091; Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1076-77, Com-
ment, supra note 144, at 413.
[Vol. 64
ANTITRUST ARBITRATION
antitrust laws is being furthered or frustrated in the course of arbitration.
175
These criticisms are insubstantial for several reasons.
1. Development of Precedent
It is true, as one commentator has stated, that a great deal of important law
has been made in the context of private litigation. 176 It simply does not follow,
however, that permitting arbitration of antitrust claims would substantially di-
minish the role of the courts in defining the contours of antitrust law. Over the
past fifteen years, an average of over 1,100 private antitrust cases per year have
been filed in federal district courts. 177 A rule permitting arbitration of antitrust
claims would no doubt reduce this number. It seems totally implausible, how-
ever, that the number would be so reduced that private antitrust suits would
cease to provide an important vehicle for the development and refinement of
antitrust precedent. The number of cases in which antitrust claims and arbitra-
tion clauses have intersected is extremely small in relation to the total number of
private antitrust suits. Even though the use of arbitration clauses conceivably
could increase as a consequence of giving arbitrators a role in resolving public
interest issues, the number of arbitrated antitrust cases surely would remain a
relatively small part of the total. The determination whether to bargain for in-
clusion of an arbitration clause or any other provision in a commercial contract
is dependent on a complex, uncertain, and intensely individualized calculation of
incentives 17 8 that would be altered little, if any, by changing the law to permit
arbitration of antitrust claims.
The criticism that arbitrators are not required to produce written decisions
and, consequently, do not contribute to the body of legal precedent was raised
during the 1960s when antitrust theory was still developing quite rapidly. New
theories of liability were emerging from the courts with some regularity. 17 9 To-
day, however, antitrust law is much more settled. Although change still occurs,
it is more of a refinement process, and antitrust law certainly can no longer be
viewed as expanding. If anything, antitrust theory is undergoing a phase of
gradual contraction. 180 The fundamental rules are set, and antitrust law now
175. See, ag., Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1091; Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1076-77; Com-
ment, supra note 144, at 412-16.
176. Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1077.
177. See AD. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1983 ANN. RP. 128.
178. See, eg., Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981);
MacNeil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CALiF. L. REv. 691 (1974); Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REv. 521 (1981).
179. At least forty of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in antitrust cases during the
period 1960-1969 can be characterized as substantive expansions of antitrust theory. Sixteen of
these were actions brought by private parties. During this period, no more than two of the Supreme
Court's antitrust decisions could be viewed as representing contractions of antitrust liability. See M.
DUGGAN, ANTrrRUST AND Tm SUPREME COURT, 1829-1980, at 71-96 (2d ed. 1981).
180. During the period 1970-1979, approximately 25 of the Supreme Court's decisions involved
substantive expressions of antitrust theory. Of this number, 13 can be characterized as contractions
of antitrust liability, and 12 as either confirmations of previous liability theories or very minor expan-
sions of liability. Of the total, 15 were private actions and 10 were government actions. See DUG-
GAN, supra note 179, at 96-111.
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has more in common with other bodies of law commonly applied by arbitrators
than it did when this anonymity argument was first made.
The criticism that arbitration awards cannot contribute to the body of legal
literature is further weakened by the fact that federal courts are themselves
rather selective about the publication of formal opinions, and a great many of
their decisions are not published.18 1 Calling attention to these necessary charac-
teristics of judicial publication does not completely rebut this aspect of the ano-
nymity argument because commercial arbitration decisions normally are not
published at all. The exercise of substantial judicial discretion regarding opinion
publication does indicate, however, that the failure of the arbitral process to
produce published opinions is not a critical one.
2. Adherence to Antitrust Laws
Arbitrators normally are not required to follow pertinent rules of law pre-
cisely unless the parties have contractually created such an obligation, and arbi-
trators' decisions are subject to little judicial review. These characteristics of the
arbitral process, which are among the reasons that arbitration is such an attrac-
tive dispute resolution alternative for many business firms, also form the basis
for another aspect of the argument that antitrust policy cannot be entrusted to
arbitration.
In addition to its other flaws, the argument that implementation of impor-
tant antitrust public policy cannot be left to a process that is both unbounded by
rules of law and unreviewable reflects a purely static view of arbitration. Many
of the rationales for precluding antitrust claims from the arbitral forum reflect
the notion that arbitration must continue to be exactly as it always has been and
that arbitration and litigation must forever remain in separate universes. How-
ever, many of the concerns related to the arbitral process' ability to protect the
public interest can easily be resolved by allowing a minimal degree of judicial
supervision over arbitration proceedings. For several reasons that will be ex-
plored in more depth, it probably is not necessary for arbitrators to follow all
antitrust laws precisely to further antitrust policy adequately; however, if
deemed necessary in a given case a court can identify and outline these laws and
require the arbitrator to apply them. Some suggestions for accomplishing mini-
mal judicial supervision, and for establishing legal authority for such supervi-
sion, are discussed below. 82
Even in the absence of judicial supervision, arbitrators have strong incen-
tives to decide antitrust claims in a manner consistent with the antitrust laws.
The fundamental function of arbitrators is to do justice between the parties. 183
181. One study found that the rules of many federal circuits create a presumption against publi-
cation and that, on the average, only 38% of federal courts of appeals opinions are published. Reyn-
olds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The
Price of Reform, 48 U. CHi. L. REv. 573, 592 (1981). It would seem logical to assume that a lower
percentage of district court opinions are published.
182. See infira text accompanying notes 352-64.
183. See eg., JIoINT COMM. OF THE AM. ARBrrATION AWS'N & THE AM. BAR ASS'N, CODE
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In the instance of an antitrust claim, the arbitrator can do justice only by giving
careful consideration to the basic nature of the claim. Arbitrators must adhere
at least to the general spirit of antitrust rules to perform their arbitral function
responsibly and to fulfill their contractual obligations to the parties. Further, it
is in the antitrust claimant's self-interest-an interest that is coterminous with
the public interest in antitrust enforcement' 84-to bring as much pressure as
possible to bear on the arbitrator, with the objective of insuring adherence to
antitrust rules. Because arbitration is a creature of agreement, the ultimate con-
straint on the power of arbitrators is the faith of contracting parties in the arbi-
tration process. If arbitrators ignore fundamental legal principles relevant to the
dispute at hand, this faith will be eroded and arbitration clauses will be em-
ployed with decreasing frequency. Furthermore, it is logical to presume that
arbitrators themselves have some faith in the arbitration process, are committed
to its preservation, and will strive to render decisions that tend to promote the
institution.
Judicial review is available to ensure that the arbitrator has adhered to the
basic spirit of the antitrust laws. In Wilko v. Swan18 5 the Supreme Court indi-
cated that, in addition to the Federal Arbitration Act's stated grounds for vacat-
ing an arbitrator's award, such an award also might be set aside for "manifest
disregard of the law." 186 Although the Court was careful to note that mere
errors of interpretation do not amount to manifest disregard of the law' 8 7 and
subsequent cases have indicated that the party seeking review on such grounds
will bear a heavy burden,' 8 8 an arbitrator's failure to adhere to the fundamental
spirit of antitrust principles should constitute a manifest disregard for the law.
The public policy in favor of competitive markets can be furthered sufficiently by
an arbitration process that observes the underlying spirit of the antitrust laws
even if occasional departures in interpretation occur. Variations in judicial in-
terpretation of antitrust laws are quite well known and seemingly are accepted
without serious doubt that basic competitive policy is being furthered in the long
run. 18 9 Variations in interpretation by arbitrators, even if unreviewable, also
OF ETHics FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DIsPurEs, Canon V (1977). See also Sterk, supra
note 116, at 491, 543 (discussing the meaning of "justice between the parties").
184. See infra text accompanying notes 251-67.
185. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
186. Id. at 436.
187. Id. 4t 436-37.
188. See Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 9,18 (1978); Trafalgar
Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1968); Saxis S.S. Co. v. Multifacs
Int'l Traders, 375 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1967); Sidarma Societa Italiana Di Armamento Spa, Venice v.
Holt Marine Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dundas Shipping & Trading Co. v. Strave-
lakis Bros., 508 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Auth., 496 F.
Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
189. Compare United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (Court found no agreement
and thus no vertical price fixing) with United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (Court
found illegal vertical price fixing on facts virtually identical to those in Colgate); compare United
States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926) (Court found vertical price restrictions legal in
consignment arrangement) with Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (Court found illegal
vertical price fixing in consignment arrangement on facts virtually identical to those in General Elec-
tric); compare Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (Court required proof
of market dominance for tying to be illegal) with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
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should not significantly affect the furtherance of antitrust policy, particularly
because the antitrust claimant has such a strong motivation to seek adherence to
basic antitrust principles in the arbitration process.
C. Arbitrator Expertise and Evidentiary Complexity
Two of the rationales employed by the American Safety court, 19° which
subsequently have been reiterated by other courts and voiced by several com-
mentators, 191 relate to the perceived lack of arbitrator expertise in dealing with
antitrust claims and the normal evidentiary complexity of antitrust cases. These
arguments are sufficiently related to be treated as a unit because evidentiary
complexity is one of the reasons for the assertion that antitrust cases are beyond
the ken of the average arbitrator. Both points are analytically vulnerable upon
close examination.
As was true of the criticisms directed at the methodology of arbitration,
192
the arguments relating to expertise and complexity presume an inflexible state of
arbitrator competency. It is true that arbitrators are frequently business execu-
tives, chosen for their commercial expertise rather than for their economic or
legal knowledge, 19 3 and that it may be incongruous to employ business execu-
tives to apply a set of rules created to regulate the business community.' 94 As
the General Counsel for the American Arbitration Association has noted, how-
ever, "the court decisions reveal a total unawareness of the varieties of arbitra-
tion procedure that are currently employed to avoid litigation," and the
conception of commercial arbitration solely as a "businessman's remedy to re-
solve commercial-type disputes. . is an obsolete characterization."'195
Despite the persistent stereotyping of arbitration by attorneys and judges,
arbitration's inherent flexibility has already been extended to the arbitrator se-
lection process. For instance, architects and engineers often serve as arbitrators
in construction disputes.196 The rules of the American Arbitration Association
require the use of lawyer-arbitrators in uninsured motorist and other accident-
related disputes. 197 Attorneys generally serve as arbitrators in statutorily man-
dated small claims arbitration. 19 8 One commentator has intimated that attor-
(1958) (Court substantially relaxed required proof of market power for tying to be illegal) and Jeffer-
son Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (Court returned to market dominance
requirement for tying to be illegal).
190. American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827.
191. See, eg., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117
(7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974); Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1090;
Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1077-78.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
193. See ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DiSPuTEs, supra note 15, at 116-17; G. GOLDBERG,
supra note 15, § 3.01.
194. Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir.
1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974); Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1090; Pitofsky,
supra note 144, at 1077-78.
195. Aksen, supra note 144, at 1105.
196. ARBrrRATION: COMMERCIAL DispuTEs, supra note 15, at 91-92.
197. G. GOLDBERG, supra note 15, at 3.
198. S. ELLIOTr, MATERiALS & CASES ON ARBITRATION 199-229 (1968).
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neys do not make the best arbitrators in ordinary sale-of-goods disputes. 19 9
Even if true, however, this conclusion apparently reflects the perception of the
business community only when technical questions of product quality are con-
cerned because attorneys are widely used as arbitrators when the interpretation
of contract language is at issue.20° Retired judges have frequently been used as
arbitrators as well.20 1 One study found vast diversity of training and back-
ground among the 20,000 arbitrators used by the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, the largest single group being lawyers, not businesspersons. 20 2 There is no
good reason that lawyers with antitrust expertise, retired judges, industrial or-
ganization economists, or others with relevant backgrounds could not be used as
arbitrators in cases involving antitrust claims. Minimal court supervision of the
arbitrator selection process in cases involving public interest issues would suffice
to ensure adequate expertise.
20 3
It also is worth noting that federal judges are not antitrust experts. Judges
are not chosen for their specialized expertise. In antitrust cases, as in other types
of cases, it is the responsibility of the attorneys and expert witnesses to educate
the judge. An arbitrator with antitrust expertise would not need this education.
Consequently, the selection of such an arbitrator should not only ensure that
fundamental antitrust principles are followed, but also should permit the pro-
ceeding to move more expeditiously than in a court room. An arbitrator with-
out specialized antitrust knowledge, however, should require no more education
of the decisionmaker than normally is necessary in antitrust litigation.
Juries, which are often impaneled in private antitrust cases, also lack
knowledge of antitrust principles.2° 4 The average juror is not likely to under-
stand antitrust issues any more readily than is the average arbitrator, even when
the arbitrator has no legal or economic training. And juries would obviously
have more difficulty with antitrust cases than would an arbitrator with some
degree of relevant training or experience. A jury in an antitrust case is usually
taught some basic economics by expert witnesses and is instructed on the rele-
vant legal principles by the district judge, who, as has just been observed, often
receives an antitrust education during the proceedings from the attorneys, expert
witnesses, and his or her own research. This education process for both judge
and jury occurs in any case involving questions of conceptual difficulty. There is
no reason that such an educational process could not take place in antitrust
arbitration. The need for this educational process could be greatly ameliorated,
however, by selection of an arbitrator with relevant training or experience. In
addition, the attorneys for each party in arbitration should have the same incen-
199. G. GOLDBERG, supra note 15, § 4.05.
200. ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 15, at 116-17.
201. Aksen, supra note 144, at 1100. Retired judges serve as permanent arbitrators in some large
distribution systems. For example, a retired judge always served as permanent arbitrator for dis-
putes within the Caring Brewery distribution system. Id. General Motors currently uses a retired
federal judge to arbitrate supply disputes with its dealers. Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1985, at 3, col. 2.
202. A.M.A., supra note 15, at 68-69.
203. The legal authority for judicial supervision is discussed infra at text &xompanying notes
352-64.
204. See P. MARcUs, ANTTRusr LAW & PRACTICE § 52 (1980).
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tive to further the educational process as they have in litigation. They certainly
have the same responsibility to their clients.
Another point that cannot be ignored is that juries commonly have extreme
difficulty with the issues in antitrust cases despite the efforts of the attorneys, the
judge, and expert witnesses to inform them.20 5 An apt illustration is found in
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.20 6 To-
ward the end of a five-month trial, and prior to nineteen days of jury delibera-
tion, the judge questioned jurors about several of the fundamental principles
underlying the antitrust issues, including cross elasticity of demand, cross elas-
ticity of supply, barriers to entry, reverse engineering, and simple definitions of
computer terms. The jury demonstrated almost no understanding of these basic
concepts.20 7 One is led to wonder whether the rule prohibiting arbitration of
antitrust claims actually contributes to the interest that a party with a weak
claim has in generating confusion.
D. Procedures for Discovery
The arbitral forum has also been criticized as inherently unsuitable for the
disposition of antitrust claims because of its traditionally minimal generation of
evidence. 208 The cornerstone of this criticism is the absence of compulsory dis-
covery in arbitration.20 9 This rationale for the nonarbitrability of antitrust
claims is also deficient in several particulars.
1. The State of Pretrial Discovery in Antitrust Litigation
The statement that arbitration is unsuitable for resolving antitrust claims
because it is not characterized by extensive discovery presumes that lengthy and
costly discovery is an institution to be venerated. Quite to the contrary, the
almost incredible proportions achieved by discovery in modern antitrust cases
205. See P. AREEDA, supra note 89, §§ 169-70; P. MARCUS, supra note 204, § 104. The sugges-
tion has been made that juries in antitrust cases be limited to those with relevant business experience
or economic training. Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L.J.
1155 (1980). Some commentators have even questioned whether juries should be used at all in
complex antitrust cases. See generally Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in
Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980) (exploring English common law exception
to right to jury trial for complex cases as applied to determine right to jury trial under U.S. CONsT.
amend. VII); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of The Seventh
Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980) (refuting existence of exception to right to jury trial at
English common law for complex cases). In one case, In re Japanese Elecs. Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980), the court held that the seventh amendment does not guarantee the
right to a jury trial in complex antitrust litigation when the jury is unlikely to be able to perform its
function in a rational manner. However, another court of appeals has held that the seventh amend-
ment right to a jury trial is absolute and that there is no exception to this right in complex antitrust
litigation. In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
929 (1980).
206. 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
207. Id. at 447-48.
208. Farber, supra note 144, at 94-95; Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1090-91; Pitofsky, supra
note 144, at 1080.
209. See supra note 208; see also G. GOLDBERG, supra note 15, § 3.03 (pre.arbitration discovery
impractical because no arbitrator has been appointed).
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are perceived by antitrust's critics as one of its chief evils.2 10 Even strong sup-
porters of antitrust policy cringe at the extraordinary amount of resources ex-
pended in discovery.2 11 Indeed, the basic soundness of national antitrust policy
probably has been obscured significantly by excessive discovery. Posner and
Easterbrook point to "the adversary process itself, including the rules for discov-
ery," as one of the reasons that antitrust cases are so costly to litigate. 212 More
particularly, they observe:
Discovery of millions of documents is routine; so is the spectre of
teams of lawyers devoting good chunks of their lives to a single case.
The high costs of litigation make it infeasible for some meritorious
cases to be brought; they make it rational for defendants to settle with-
out contesting liability (recall that this is one source of plaintiffs' as-
serted ability to use legal blackmail in class actions); they use valuable
attorneys' and judges' time when litigation occurs. Neither judge nor
jury can comprehend a 100,000 page record or assimilate 1,000,000 ex-
hibits. Facts that overwhelm also trivialize.
2 13
Pretrial procedures may be more costly and difficult than the tri-
als themselves. Discovery is permitted in all civil [antitrust] cases even
into irrelevant matters; the theory is that the irrelevant will lead to the
relevant. This approach, combined with the difficulty of supervising
any discovery running onto the millions of documents, has made the
pretrial process interminable.
21 4
Areeda states that "[a] few words can hardly convey the fearful dimensions
of many antitrust cases."'2 15 Judge Wyzanski has referred to the "enormous,
nearly cancerous, growth of exhibits, depositions, and ore tenus testimony" in
antitrust cases, noting that "[flew judges who have sat in such cases have at-
tempted to digest the plethora of evidence, or indeed could do so and at the same
time do justice to other litigation in their courts. ' ' 216 Judge 'Renfrew asked
whether open-ended discovery has replaced "trial by ambush" with "trial by
avalanche."'2 17 After taking note of the millions of pages of documents often
produced in antitrust cases, Laurence Tribe commented: "Surely a celestial visi-
tor would think us mad if informed that we endeavor to promote economic effi-
ciency through this process."
2 18
210. See, ag., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 232 (1976); R. Pos-
NER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTrr~uST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, & OTHER MATERIALS 595-600
(2d ed. 1981).
211. See, eg., P. AREEDA, supra note 89, § 170; M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, IL PrroFsKY & H.
GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION 54-55 (2d ed. 1983); F. SCHERER,
supra note 5, at 510-12; L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRsr, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION 24 (6th ed. 1983).
212. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 210, at 596.
213. Id. at 595.
214. Id. at 599.
215. P. AREEDA, supra note 89, § 170.
216. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D.PI. 1964), aff'd except as to
decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
217. Panel Discussion, Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 ANTITRUST L.L 57, 59 (1975).
218. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice, THE ATLANTIC, July 1979, at 25, 28.
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There is at present a burgeoning movement to correct the many vices of
antitrust and other complex litigation, including excessive discovery. 2 19 This
problem is of far greater scope and magnitude than the one under discussion
here, although the two problems are intertwined. One frequent suggestion of the
reform movement is that there be greater encouragement of the use of nonjudi-
cial forums. 220 Permitting arbitration of antitrust claims will not solve the
problems of our judicial system-we are dealing here with a very small part of
the total picture. On the other hand, it seems rather clear that the existing rule
of nonarbitrability for such claims is incongruous in the present judicial environ-
ment of congestion, delay, inordinate cost, and intemperate discovery. That ex-
cessive discovery is perceived as one of the primary ills of our legal system
generally, and of antitrust litigation particularly, leads to the conclusion that
lack of discovery is quite a tenuous ground for attacking the suitability of
arbitration.
2. The Arbitrator's Subpoena Power
Some limited discovery is available in arbitration proceedings. Although
arbitrators do not have specific legal authority to compel prehearing discovery,
section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides the arbitrator with authority to
compel witnesses to testify before the arbitrator and to bring "any book, record,
document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case."
'221
The arbitrator, in other words, has complete subpoena power that can be en-
forced through a contempt citation.222 This power normally is not used to com-
pel the type of extensive prehearing discovery common to litigation because such
discovery is inimical to the fundamental nature of arbitration as an efficient,
inexpensive process and usually would not be desired by the parties to arbitra-
tion. On the other hand, this complete subpoena power can be molded to fit the
needs of the proceedings. Even though the arbitrator's authority to compel pro-
duction of evidence is limited to proceedings in the arbitrator's presence, this
authority could be employed in a variety of ways. A form of discovery can be
conducted, for example, in a prehearing conference attended by the arbitrator.
The use of such a conference is already known to the arbitration process.223 The
arbitrator's subpoena power can also be exercised prior to the hearing at various
219. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
SECTION OF LITIGATION, FIRST REPORT (1977), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 140 (1982); SPECIAL COMM.
FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LITIGATION, SECOND
REPORT (1980), reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 140 (1982); Gruenberger, Discovery Abusers Have Many Bags
Full of Tricks, Legal Times of Wash., July 4, 1983, at 18, col. 1; The Costly Paper Chase Clogging the
Courts, Bus. WK., June 23, 1980, at 134. Federal discovery rules were amended in 1983 with a view
toward reducing the abuse of discovery procedures, but a commonly held view is that these changes
are essentially symbolic and will be effective only if the courts are serious about enforcing them. See,
e.g., id.
220. See, eg., Pogue, Hobbs, Barnette, Marks & Hall, Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Techniques, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 271 (1984); Dombroff, Judicial Resolutions Not Always the Most
Desirable, Legal Times of Wash., Feb. 28, 1983, at 15, col. 1.
221. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
222. Id.
223. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES 10 (1982).
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times and places so as to resemble traditional discovery if this is what the parties
desire.
Complementing the power to compel the production of evidence is the arbi-
trator's authority and responsibility to draw any appropriate inferences from a
party's failure to produce evidence at the hearing.224 Whenever logic suggests
that a particular bit of testimony or an item of physical evidence probably exists
and that it probably is in one party's possession, that party's failure to produce
either the evidence or a satisfactory explanation for its absence can be given
significant probative weight by the arbitrator.22s Fact finders in litigation draw
inferences from silence, thus creating an important incentive for the parties to
disclose all relevant evidence. An arbitrator with any substantial experience in
gathering and evaluating information, whether as an attorney, former judge, ac-
ademic researcher, or practitioner of some other analytically oriented vocation,
should be able to perform this inference-drawing function.
3. The Success of Arbitration in Handling Similarly Complex Issues
Many questions in antitrust cases are quite fact-sensitive, such as those in-
volving the existence of a conspiracy,
226 the presence of a price manipulative
2 27
or exclusionary motive,228 or the possession and degree of market power.
22 9
Sometimes the evidence bearing on these and other issues is elusive, conflicting,
and confusing. The same might be said, however, about many of the issues com-
monly dealt with by arbitrators, such as fraud,230 good or bad faith,23 1 du-
ress,232 unconscionability, 233 existence and strength of an alleged industry
custom, 234 the scope of a promise of confidentiality, 235 or breach of fiduciary
224. Aksen, supra note 144, at 1101; see also AMERIcAN ARBITRATION Ass'N, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION RuLEs 31-32 (1982) (arbitrator is judge of relevancy and materiality of evidence and
may request additional evidence from the parties); JOINT COMM. OF THE AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N
& THE AM. BAR Ass'N, CODE OF ETICS FOR ARBrrRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DisPUrEs, Canon
IV.G. (1977) (arbitrator has broad authority regarding evidentiary weight).
225. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
226. See, eg., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); Theatre Enter. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306
U.S. 208 (1939).
227. See, ag., Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 104
S. Ct. 242 (1983); Alloy Int'l v. Hooker-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); Girardi v.
Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963).
228. See, ag., Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
229. See, eg., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir.
1982); Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981); Red Diamond Supply,
Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 8:27 (1981); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., 613 F.2d 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965 (1980).
230. See, eg., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Andriot v.
Quickprint of Am., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
231. See, eg., Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 508 (E.D. Mich.
1974), affd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
232. See, ag., Taylor v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. IlM. 1982).
233. Id.
234. For a discussion demonstrating the importance of custom and usage of trade in textile
industry arbitration, see ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DIspuTEs, supra note 15, at 150-53.
235. See, eg., N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1976).
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duty.2 3 6 Without the far-reaching inquiry for which discovery in antitrust cases
is so notorious, there obviously will not be the same exhaustion of every detail in
arbitration as there is in litigation. That many elusive, fact-sensitive issues are
determined routinely in arbitration, apparently to the general satisfaction of the
many parties who continue to include arbitration clauses in their contracts, how-
ever, suggests that similar kinds of questions in antitrust cases could also be
resolved satisfactorily without extensive discovery. Contrary to the normal
mentality in litigation, a few stones may remain unturned without perverting the
basic fact-finding process. This, essentially, is what the parties stipulated when
they agreed to arbitration.237 And, it must be remembered, the cases in which
the issue of antitrust arbitrability has arisen have been primarily private, con-
tract-based disputes, despite their public interest overtones. More will be made
of this point later, but it bears emphasis that these usually are not the types of
antitrust cases in which the history and structure of an entire industry are criti-
cal inquiries.238 The parties to such a private antitrust suit might try to inun-
date one another with such evidence, but the crucial issues normally are much
narrower.
239
4. The Potential for Court-Ordered Discovery in Aid of Arbitration
Although courts traditionally have ordered discovery in aid of the arbitra-
tion process only if state law has so provided, 24° if the parties have so agreed, 241
or if exceptional circumstances have been present,242 in recent years several fed-
eral courts have demonstrated less reluctance to issue discovery orders in con-
nection with pending arbitration proceedings. 243 Even without such a trend,
236. See, eg., Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983);
Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
237. In Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), the Supreme Court noted this trade-off be-
tween economy and legal certainty: "Congress has afforded participants in transactions subject to its
legislative power an opportunity generally to secure prompt, economical and adequate solution of
controversies through arbitration if the parties are willing to accept less certainty of legally correct
adjustment."
238. See infra text accompanying notes 288-91.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
240. See, e-g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-412 (1982); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 3102(c) (McKinney
1970); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7309(a) (Purdon 1981).
241. See eg., Mobil Oil Indonesia, Inc. v. Asamera Oil, Ltd., 43 N.Y.2d 276, 372 N.E.2d 21,
401 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1977).
242. See, eg., Coastal States Trading, Inc. v. Zenith Nay. S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330, 342 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (no showing of compelling circumstances in diversity action brought against a Panamanian
vessel owner to recover the value of cargo lost when vessel disappeared at sea); Bergen Shipping Co.
v. Japan Marine Servs., Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 430, 435 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (test is "necessity"; the
ship's crew was about to leave U.S. and be assigned to international vessels); Ferro Union Corp. v.
S.S. Ionic Coast, 43 F.R.D. 11, 14 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (that ship was chartered under foreign flag and
would be docked at an American port only for four days, and that future ports were unknown held
to be exceptional circumstances); Penn Tanker Co. v. C.H.Z. Rolimpex, Warszawa, 199 F. Supp.
716, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (no need to compel respondent to comply with discovery in arbitration
proceedings involving claim for damages for breach of charter party agreement); Commercial Sol-
vents Corp. v. Louisiana Liquid Fertilizer Co., 20 F.R.D. 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (that respondent
needed information from petitioner's employers, who were residing in another state, held not suffi-
ciently compelling to order discovery).
243. See Willenken, The Often Overlooked Use of Discovery in Aid of Arbitration and the Spread
of the New York Rule to Federal Common Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 173 (1979); Note, Relaxing the
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however, the mere presence of colorable antitrust claims would seem to be an
exceptional circumstance warranting court-ordered discovery in aid of arbitra-
tion.244 On the other hand, the existence of a legal basis for court-ordered dis-
covery in conjunction with arbitration certainly does not mean that discovery
should always be employed in the arbitration of antitrust claims.245 Moreover,
if it is employed, its dimensions should be restricted to comport with the basic
nature of arbitration. That is, discovery can be made available when necessary,
but it should never be permitted to turn arbitration into the paper-ridden
nightmare that antitrust litigation has become.
E. Protection of the Public Interest
The broadest argument against the arbitrability of antitrust claims, and per-
haps the most difficult to articulate precisely, is that the public interest in com-
petitive markets cannot be protected adequately in the arbitral process. One
commentator, agreeing with the existing rule of nonarbitrability, recently char-
acterized this rationale as the only truly cogent argument supporting the rule.246
His position is that arbitrators serve only to do justice between the parties,
whereas the underlying purpose of the antitrust laws has little to do with justice.
Rather, the purpose of antitrust is to protect those not party to the arbitration
process, namely, the public.
247
In addition to antitrust claims, there are other types of claims, some of
which were mentioned earlier,248 in which the prospect of arbitration has pro-
duced varying degrees of uneasiness among courts and commentators because
third party interests not represented in the arbitration proceedings might be af-
fected significantly.249 It has been posited that the arbitrability of such claims
should turn on whether the law creating the particular rights in question was
intended primarily to do justice between the parties or to accomplish some
broader goal.2 50 According to this line of reasoning, which supports the rule of
nonarbitrability for antitrust claims, arbitration is well suited for resolution of
those disputes in the former category, but not for those in the latter. Although
Standard for Court-Ordered Discovery in Aid of CommercialArbitration, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1448
(1982).
244. The factors leading courts to conclude that exceptional circumstances sufficient to warrant
court-ordered discovery existed were identified by Willenken, supra note 243, at 181-82, as follows:
(1) information exclusively within the possession of hostile witnesses; (2) size of the claim; (3) com-
plexity of the claim; (4) need for documentary proof, (5) unknown defense; (6) cost of discovery
compared to magnitude of claim; (7) potential to accomplish discovery without delaying arbitration;
and (8) unknown identity of persons potentially liable. Several of these factors would usually be
present in the typical case involving a private antitrust claim.
245. For some cautionary observations about discovery getting out of hand in arbitration, see
Callahan, Discovery in Construction Arbitration, 37 ARB. J. 3 (1982).
246. Sterk, supra note 116, at 503-07.
247. Id. at 507 n.90.
248. Supra text accompanying notes 103-22.
249. Domestic relations cases, for instance, often involve the additional interests of children. See
Sterk, supra note 116, at 493-502. Disputes involving claims against a bankrupt debtor frequently
affect the interest of other creditors. Deitrick, supra note 122; Sterk, supra note 116, at 533-37.
250. Sterk, supra note 116, at 491-93, 543.
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this argument is logical and is attractive for its simplicity in situations in which
the underlying statutory objective can be ascertained with reasonable assurance,
it does not go far enough. In the end, the suitability of arbitration for private
claims that also involve the interests of either specifically identifiable third par-
ties or the general public depends on (1) the alignment of those outsider interests
with the interests of the parties themselves and (2) the nature of the incentives
for pursuing such interests.
1. Alignment of Interests
If the private interest of the claimant is the same as the broader public
interest that prompted creation of the private right in the first place, private
resolution of the claim will normally serve the public interest.251 Although this
general proposition is self-evident, it is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant
by interest. The typical private party asserting an antitrust claim cares little
about vindicating the public interest in competitive markets. Instead, the plain-
tiff's immediate concern is to protect a private property interest. In fact, be-
cause of the prospect of treble damages, the plaintiff's immediate goal might be
the procurement of a windfall. Motive and interest are not the same, however.
If the law defines the standards for measuring the validity of the private claim in
the same way that it defines the standards for furthering the public interest, the
private and public interests are not antagonistic and the pursuance of the former
serves the latter. This is, of course, the whole idea behind private antitrust en-
forcement. Legal standards for the proof of civil antitrust claims252 are the same
whether the plaintiff is a private party or the government.
The choice of a dispute resolution forum does not affect this alignment of
private and public interests; these interests remain the same whether litigation,
settlement, or arbitration is chosen. The confidential nature of arbitration has
led some courts and commentators to theorize that if private antitrust claims are
arbitrated the arbitration process itself could subvert the public interest by being
used as a vehicle to restrain trade.253 This argument is not persuasive for several
reasons. First, the resolution of a private antitrust dispute normally cannot be
251. Some antitrust doctrine, especially that relating to "vertical restraints" such as resale price
maintenance and tying agreements, has been criticized by several observers as inimical to consumer
welfare and, consequently, contrary to the public interest. See, ag., R. BORK, THE ANTiTRUST
PARADOX 280-98, 365-81 (1978); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Rule: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86
(1960).
Regardless of any debate concerning the wisdom of a given legal theory, for present purposes it
must be assumed that the public interest is what Congress and the courts have defined it to be.
252. Of course, the legal standards for proof of criminal violations of the antitrust laws are
somewhat different because of the greater burden of proof borne by the government and because of
the necessity of proving criminal intent. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422 (1978).
253. See, eg., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.
1968) (arbitration inappropriate for determination of whether license agreement violated the Sher-
man Act because Congress intended these claims to be litigated); Loevinger, supra note 144, at 1091
(listing disadvantages of the arbitral process-one such disadvantage being the invalidity of the arbi-
tration clause because the agreement itself might constitute restraint of trade).
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employed as a means to suppress competition without collusion between the
parties to the dispute. There is not the slightest hint of collusion between the
parties for the purpose of restraining competition in any of the cases involving
arbitration and antitrust claims. The parties have clearly been antagonists in the
truest sense, and the only role that arbitration could have played is the salutary
one of reducing the intensity of the conflict. Second, if restraint of trade is the
motive of the parties, they are not likely to use the arbitration process as a tool
to accomplish their goal. It would be foolish to bring in an independent referee
when the objective is to violate the law. The arbitrator would have to be a party
to the collusion, and the difficulty of achieving and maintaining an agreement in
restraint of trade normally increases as the number of participants increases.
254
Third, the possibility that private antitrust dispute resolution might itself result
in a collusive restraint of trade is certainly no greater in arbitration than it is
when the parties reach an out-of-court settlement. In fact, because the presence
of an arbitrator introduces significant complicating factors into such a scheme,
contractual settlements are much more likely to be used as a method for facili-
tating competitive restraints than arbitration proceedings.
More will be said later about the anomaly of favoring settlement of antitrust
claims while prohibiting arbitration,255 but it bears emphasizing that the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice has the authority and responsibility
to police the results of private antitrust dispute resolution whether settlement or
arbitration is the chosen vehicle. In past years, the Division has taken action
against settlement agreements deemed to have been trade restraints themselves.
In Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States25 6 the government successfully chal-
lenged as price fixing an agreement among fifteen sugar refiners that required
each firm to announce publicly any price change and then to adhere to that price
until it made another, similarly publicized price change. The genesis of the
agreement had been a dispute among refiners over the practice of granting secret
price concessions to certain customers. Those concessions were viewed by some
firms as constituting violations of the price discrimination prohibition of section
2 of the Clayton Act, 25 7 and the ultimate agreement was essentially a settlement
of the dispute. Out-of-court settlement of other types of claims, such as patent
infringement, also have resulted in government antitrust action.
2 58
The idea that the private antitrust claimant's interest aligns with the public
interest has also been challenged because contracts of adhesion are likely to exist
in cases in which antitrust claims are raised.259 According to this argument, if
the relationship between the parties is characterized by a gross inequality of bar-
254. See Fraas & Greer, Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis, 26 1.
INDUS. ECON. 21 (1977); Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. &
EcoN. 13 (1974).
255. See infra text accompanying notes 293-305.
256. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982).
258. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931) (the "Cracking"
case).
259. See supra note 253 and accompanying text; see also Comment, supra note 144, at 415 (dis-
cussing the use of arbitration by a private party to insulate itself from the full force of antitrust laws).
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gaining power and overreaching so that the contract containing the arbitration
clause was foisted upon a weaker party, that party is essentially a pawn of the
"monopolist" and is in no position to represent the public interest effectively.
26°
This hypothesis, too, is speculative; there is no evidence that gross power dispar-
ity and overreaching are any more likely to occur in a dispute in which an anti-
trust claim is asserted than in other disputes arising out of contractual
relationships. There is no indication in any of the antitrust-arbitration cases that
the underlying contract or the arbitration clause was anything other than the
product of arm's length bargaining.
Some antitrust-arbitration cases no doubt involve parties of unequal bar-
gaining power. As previously observed, the preexisting contractual relationship
between parties to an antitrust dispute frequently takes the form of a franchise
or other distribution arrangement. 261 In these arrangements it is not uncommon
for the franchisee or other distributor to possess fewer resources and possibly
less bargaining power than the supplier.262 That there is not precise parity of
bargaining power, however, does not mean that the weaker party is bereft of the
ability to actively pursue its own interests. The weaker party inevitably is a
business firm, presumably with some resources and a degree of relevant skill.
Moreover, such contracts are of such obvious importance that even a party oper-
ating at a resource disadvantage would be expected to have access to legal coun-
sel, 263 whose responsibilities to the client would include an explanation of the
legal effect of the arbitration clause and other proposed contractual provisions.
Even accepting the proposition that contracts of adhesion are likely to exist
in relationships that later give rise to antitrust claims, the alignment of public
and private interests is not necessarily altered for at least three reasons. First,
the district courts are required by the Federal Arbitration Act to inquire into the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate prior to ordering arbitration.264 An
assertion that gross inequality of bargaining power had produced a contract of
adhesion would, of course, be subject to determination by the court only if it
related specifically to the arbitration clause itself.265 Any claim of adhesion re-
lating to the entire contract would be determined by the arbitrator.26 6 This type
of issue, involving basic notions of fair play, is of a character traditionally viewed
as particularly well suited to the arbitration process. 26 7 Therefore, a claim of
overreaching should be susceptible to adequate scrutiny before either forum.
260. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
262. See generally Bobling, Franchise Terminations Under the Sherman Act: Populism and Rela-
tional Power, 53 TEx. L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1975) (advocating stricter controls over the discretion of
the franchisor to terminate the franchise as one way of dealing with the problems and abuses arising
from the disparity in economic power between the franchisor and franchisee).
263. Such legal expenses usually would be deductible under I.R.C. § 162(a) (1984) as "ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred. . in carrying on any trade or business."
264. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
265. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
266. Id.
267. The arbitral forum has been perceived as suitable for resolution of related issues such as




Second, the "weaker" party continues to possess the same interest in pursuing
an antitrust or any other type of claim regardless of the forum, and, indeed,
actually might be more prone than a stronger party to pursue a claim vigorously
because his or her livelihood is more dependent on a successful resolution. The
nature of the dispute resolution forum does not reconfigure this interest. Third,
it could be plausibly argued that the party with less bargaining power in an
adhesion scenario has interests that are much more closely aligned with those of
the general public than does a party with greater economic power.
2. Incentives
Assuming that the private interest of an antitrust claimant is aligned with
that of the public, adequate incentives for the private party to pursue a course of
action that serves this common interest still must be present. In implementing a
regime of private antitrust enforcement, Congress saw the necessity of incorpo-
rating incentives and did so in several ways.268 The most powerful incentive is
the prospect of treble damages.269 Of significance, too, are the statutory provi-
sion for an award of reasonable attorney fees to the successful antitrust plain-
tiff270 and the availability of rather liberal venue selection.27 ' In addition,
Congress has provided that a finding of liability in a prior civil or criminal suit
brought by the Justice Department constitutes prima facie proof of liability in a
subsequent private suit brought against the same defendant and based on the
same conduct.272 Apart from legislatively created incentives, the Supreme
Court has also given some advantage to the private plaintiff by holding that the
defenses of in pari delicto and passing-on cannot be used to fend off antitrust
claims.
273
Although it has been expressed in a variety of ways, the question of incen-
tives has been at the heart of the most persuasive arguments against arbitration
268. See supra text accompanying notes 83-90.
269. Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
270. Id.
271. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982).
272. Clayton Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982).
273. In Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the Supreme
Court held that a defendant in a private antitrust action may not raise the defense of in par! delicto
("in equal fault"). Consequently, a plaintiff who also was a party to the illegal restraint of trade may
pursue a treble damage claim against a coparticipant. The only possible exception to the nonavaila-
bility of the in par delicto defense is found in the situation in which plaintiff was a co-initiator of the
illegal conduct. One court held that the in par delicto defense may be raised when the plaintiff was
"present at the creation" of the scheme and when the "illegal conspiracy would not have been
formed but for the plaintiff's participation." Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.
1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977).
In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487-90 (1968), the Supreme
Court rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff had suffered no damage because it had passed on
any illegal overcharges to its own customers in the form of higher prices. Rejection of the passing-on
concept has turned out to be a two-edged sword, however. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977), the Court ruled that passing-on also could not be used offensively. The result of the
latter holding is that "indirect purchasers," those with at least one distribution level between them-
selves and the defendant, cannot receive damages based on the passing on of an illegal overcharge
from an intermediate party who purchased directly from the defendant.
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by both courts and researchers. 274 If use of the arbitration process substantially
reduces the incentives for private antitrust enforcement, then the existing rule
against arbitration is probably correct because significant social costs from di-
minished competition might eventuate from a contrary rule.2 "5 It should be
kept in mind, however, that these costs would be offset to some extent by the
savings of societal resources that normally result from the use of extrajudicial
dispute resolution mechanisms.2 76 Litigation consumes an extraordinary
amount of resources in a fundamentally nonproductive endeavor.277 Any reduc-
tion in the amount of resources allocated to dispute resolution is to be en-
couraged so long as other important public interests are not unduly harmed. At
this juncture, it obviously is impossible to know whether the savings to society
through the increased use of arbitration would be of sufficient magnitude to off-
set the costs of diminished antitrust enforcement. In any event, this question
involves a balancing of critical social policies that would necessitate congres-
sional action. Thus, in the absence of legislation specifically weighing these con-
cerns, we must operate from the premise that significantly reduced private
enforcement of the antitrust laws would not be acceptable.
It is far from clear, however, that a rule permitting arbitration of antitrust
claims would substantially diminish the incentives for private enforcement. It is
true that an arbitrator, or arbitration panel, normally is not required to follow
legal rules, such as those providing for treble damages and attorney fees, pre-
cisely.278 An arbitrator cannot fulfill the responsibility to do justice between the
parties, however, without giving full consideration to the legal principles argued
by each side.2 79 These principles would include treble damages and attorney
fees. Moreover, relatively minimal judicial supervision of the arbitrator selec-
274. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir.
1968) (indicating that although arbitration will generally provide a business solution, it will not
necessarily do so in accord with the principles of the Sherman Act because arbitrators are not likely
to give a sympathetic hearing to antitrust claims); Farber, supra note 144, at 91-93 (Congress en-
acted § 12 of Clayton Act for purpose of encouraging antitrust litigation); Loevinger, supra note 144,
at 1090 (arbitrators do not have independence of judges and are more likely to be unsympathetic to
antitrust rules); Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1079 (Clayton Act designed to encourage private anti-
trust litigation; statutory provisions not binding on the arbitrator); Sterk, supra note 116, at 507
("The knowledge that an antitrust plaintiff will receive fair compensation [through arbitration] is not
likely to have the same deterrent effect as the prospect that an undeserving plaintiff will receive a
treble damage award."); Comment, supra note 144, at 415-18 (arbitration is "shield" from antitrust
laws).
275. But cf. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case
for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329, 335 (1974) (sets forth the proposition that the treble
damage remedy creates "perverse incentives" which ultimately produce additional social costs).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 14-20.
277. This statement certainly is not intended to convey the idea that dispute resolution is a
noneconomic activity. Quite to the contrary, the process of resolving disputes is an integral part of a
market-based economy. Dispute resolution is essentially a cost-an element of the labor co3t in-
volved in producing goods and services. In addition, basic economic principles are applicable to
many aspects of the dispute resolution mechanisms themselves. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SIS OF LAW §§ 19.1, 21.1, 21.4 (2d ed. 1977).
278. See M. DOMKE, THE LAW & PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 30.02 (1968)
("The extent of the arbitrators' authority to award damages may be stated expressly by the parties or
by their reference to rules of an agency which specifically provide the measure of damages.").
279. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
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tion process and the arbitration hearing could provide a high degree of assurance
that fundamental antitrust principles would be followed.
280
The same arguments can be made with respect to the prima facie effect of a
judicial finding of liability in a prior government suit. This positive principle of
antitrust law must be fully weighed by an arbitrator to perform his or her basic
task. One commentator has observed that questions concerning the scope of a
prior decree and its effect on subsequent private litigation often prove vexatious
for the courts and probably would be virtually impossible for an arbitrator.
281
This position again assumes arbitration to be a steady-state process when, in
fact, it is best known for its flexibility. Some judicial oversight of arbitrator
selection would greatly increase the likelihood that private enforcement incen-
tives, such as the prima facie effect of prior government suits, would be accorded
sufficient deference in the arbitration process.282 Moreover, if deemed necessary
to ensure that this and other incentives are given appropriate consideration, rele-
vant judicial instructions to the arbitrator could be employed, coupled with sub-
sequent limited review.
283
The argument that an arbitrator is likely to consider defenses that cannot be
considered in litigation, such as in pari delecto and passing-on, is of precisely the
same character as those arguments just discussed and can be dealt with in the
same way. On the other hand, even if there exists a real possibility that an
arbitrator will give weight to impermissible defenses and even if this prospect
cannot be forestalled adequately, this action by an arbitrator would not necessar-
ily affect the incentive of the private claimant. If such a defense could be as-
serted, its existence and ultimate chance of even partial success would be very
difficult to predict ahead of time. This is true of many legal theories but seems
particularly true of a theory such as in part delecto. When in pari delecto is a
permissible defense, as in the case of some questions of contract enforceability,
its inherently nebulous character is such that predictability of outcome is quite
low.284 Therefore, even if there were no safeguards to lessen the likelihood of
impermissible defenses being introduced into the arbitration process, the chance
of these defenses actually being raised and significantly affecting the resolution
of any given antitrust claim is sufficiently small that an antitrust claimant will
not be dissuaded from pursuing a claim. It must always be kept in mind that the
concern here is whether private enforcement might be deterred substantially by
permitting arbitration, not whether the outcome of a particular antitrust dispute
would always be precisely the same in the arbitral forum as in the judicial forum.
Concern has also been voiced that because arbitration agreements some-
times specify the location of the arbitration hearing, allowing arbitration of anti-
trust claims might deprive the antitrust claimant of the relatively liberal venue
280. See infra text accompanying notes 348-64.
281. Pitofsky, supra note 144, at 1077-79.
282. See infra text accompanying notes 348-64.
283. Id.
284. See J. CALAMARi & J. PERLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACrs § 22-12 (2d ed. 1977).
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selection normally available under antitrust law.285 This result does not appear
likely. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court which finds that a
valid written arbitration agreement has been made must order the dispute arbi-
trated within the district where the petition was filed seeking the order.286 Thus,
the location of the arbitration hearing will sometimes be determined not by the
specification in the agreement but by the location of the district court where an
order compelling arbitration is sought. If a lawsuit has already been filed by the
antitrust claimant in connection with the dispute, the defendant will seek such
an order in the same court in which the suit is pending. In such a case, the
contractual provision regarding location of the arbitration hearing will have no
effect. Thus, the antitrust claimant will have the same opportunity to select
among several possible venues that such a claimant would have had if there had
been no arbitration agreement. If the party seeking arbitration initiates the dis-
pute resolution process by seeking an order compelling arbitration, it is likely
that he or she will choose to do so in the district specified in the arbitration
agreement. In this situation the contractual selection of venue will be effective.
The result of all of this is that when several possible venues exist the party that
initiates the dispute resolution process enjoys the advantage in making the selec-
tion. This is normally the result regardless of the existence of an arbitration
clause; therefore, the presence of such a clause may have no measurable impact
on site selection. In addition, venue selection agreements can be made whether
or not there is any provision for arbitration, and such agreements normally are
enforceable unless unreasonable.287 Arbitration, therefore, has little bearing on
site selection opportunities for the antitrust claimant.
Perhaps the most important fact relating to the question of private enforce-
ment incentives is that the perceived conflict between antitrust law and arbitra-
tion almost never arises in the stereotypical context of a "pure" antitrust claim.
In practically every case in which the question of antitrust claim arbitrabiity has
arisen, there has existed a broad dispute between the parties concerning their
ongoing contractual relationship.288 Many of these cases involve either a pure
breach of contract claim or some variation thereof, the defendant raising the
antitrust claim with the objective of either invalidating a contract provision on
the ground of illegality or simply introducing a complicating factor into an es-
sentially private commercial dispute.289 Even when the antitrust claim is as-
serted by the plaintiff, it generally is inextricably entwined with a variety of
285. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982), provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district
wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may be served
in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
286. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
287. See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972) (established the right of parties to
agree on forum and held that forum selection clause will be upheld unless unreasonable). For an
application of this rule to a forum-selection clause in an antitrust case, see Bense v. Interstate Bat-
tery Sys. of Am., Inc., 683 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1982).
288. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
289. See eg., N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1976); Associated Milk Dealers, Inc. v. Milk Drivers Local 753, 422 F.2d 546 (7th Cir.
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other contract or tort claims and, again, is essentially a private commercial dis-
pute.290 Only in the exceptional case has the dispute been grounded fundamen-
tally in antitrust law. 29 1 Thus, the dispute in most of these cases would have
arisen regardless of the presence or absence of an antitrust claim. In fact, be-
cause these disputes normally involve a plethora of nonantitrust issues asserted
by both parties, it is probable that the dispute would have arisen because of a
rupture in an ongoing contractual relationship, irrespective of which party hap-
pened to be the plaintiff. If the dispute would have arisen in any event, the
antitrust claims probably would have found their way into the dispute regardless
of the nature of the forum. Therefore, whether the law permits arbitration of the
antitrust issues arguably has very little to do with the probability that these is-
sues will be asserted and will receive a hearing. The effect on incentives for
private antitrust claim assertion, as a consequence, appears to be minimal or
nonexistent.
Finally, it must be remembered that from the businessperson's perspective
arbitration normally is both less expensive and less foreboding than litigation.
2 92
Even if permitting the arbitration of antitrust claims might negatively influence
certain private enforcement incentives, it is likely that the businessperson's per-
ception of arbitration would offset the reduction of any other enforcement incen-
tives and would actually increase the incidence of antitrust claim assertions.
V. THE ANOMALY OF PERMITTING PoST-DIsPuTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS
Reference has been made to the exceptional treatment given by the courts
to post-dispute arbitration agreements.2 93 Arbitration agreements have been
held enforceable with respect to antitrust claims already in existence when the
agreement is made because the arbitration provision is viewed as simply another
form of settlement and the right of disputants to pursue an agreed settlement is a
1970); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968); American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
290. See Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) S 66,296 (2d Cir. 1984); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576
F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir.
1976); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming
Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) % 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Andriot v. Quickprint of Am., Inc. 563 F. Supp. 48
(S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983);
D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Janmort Leas-
ing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410
F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Black v.
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1975); Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors
Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 987
(1975).
291. Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); see Varo v.
Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974).
292. A.M.A., supra note 15, at 45-47.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
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deeply embedded attribute of freedom of contract.294
Settlement without adjudication plays a crucial role in dispute resolution,
even in the case of private claims to which a public interest attaches. In anti-
trust the importance of this role can be seen in the large percentage of private
treble damage and injunctive actions that are terminated by agreement prior to
trial.2 95 It no doubt would be incongruous to encourage the resolution of pri-
vate antitrust claims through agreed settlement, as the law does now, but
prohibit resolution through post-dispute arbitration. There is clear logical con-
sistency in viewing this type of arbitration agreement as tantamount to contrac-
tual settlement and enforcing it accordingly. The question immediately
apparent, however, is whether it is also logically consistent to treat post-dispute
arbitration clauses differently than future-disputes arbitration provisions.
Upon close scrutiny, most of the rationales for denying enforceable status to
future-disputes arbitration agreements apply with equal force to post-dispute
arbitration clauses. The rebuttal to these arguments is also the same. What has
been said, for example, about method of decisionmaking and lack of review, 296
arbitrator expertise and evidentiary complexity,297 and procedures for discov-
ery2 98 can be said about the arbitration process regardless of whether the anti-
trust claims already had been asserted when the agreement was made.
Some differences exist between the two types of arbitration agreements, but
it is not clear that these distinctions justify different legal treatment. When the
various rationales are considered, it becomes apparent that the fundamental dis-
tinction between future-disputes arbitration agreements on the one hand and
post-dispute arbitration or settlement agreements on the other lies in the parties'
awareness of possible antitrust claims and the effect that this awareness might
have on the parties' incentives. It is important to recognize that the distinction
relating to the parties' awareness of antitrust claims is not really based on con-
tractual intent. As previously noted, in the typical contract containing a rela-
tively broad arbitration clause, the objectively ascertainable intent of the parties
probably is to employ the arbitral forum for resolution of any disputes that
might arise from their relationship.299 This probable intent of the parties, cou-
pled with a judicial presumption of arbitrability, 3° ° leads to the conclusion that
antitrust claims are usually within the scope of a future-disputes arbitration
clause.30 1 Instead of contractual intent, the arguable distinction between future-
disputes and post-dispute agreements is based on the effect that the parties'
294. See A. ComitN, supra note 43, § 1268, at 1025-27.
295. During a representative period, 1964-69, over 3,000 private antitrust cases were dismissed
by agreement of the parties, while only 554 continued to judgment. Posner, A Statistical Study of
Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 382-83 (1970).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 172-89.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 190-207.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 208-20.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 153-63.
300. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); Prima
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); see also supra text accompanying
notes 164-71 (arbitration clauses interpreted with great liberality).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 153-71.
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awareness of antitrust claims might have on their respective incentives regarding
claim assertion and defense.
A claimant surrenders the special incentives for private enforcement, such
as the prospect of treble damages, as surely in a settlement or post-dispute arbi-
tration agreement as in a future-disputes arbitration agreement. On the other
hand, the awareness of a possible treble damage award has an undeniable effect
on the bargaining position of the parties when they negotiate an extrajudicial
resolution of their dispute. It is probably true that this awareness is greater
when a dispute has already arisen and an antitrust claim has already been as-
serted. If so, although the alignment of the claimant's interest with that of the
public clearly does not change, the incentive to pursue that interest could possi-
bly change. If the claimant's incentives to engage in private enforcement are
substantially diminished by virtue of the arbitration provision, the existing rule
prohibiting arbitration of antitrust claims under future disputes clauses is proba-
bly correct.
30 2
However, as previously noted, it is not readily apparent that these incen-
tives are diminished. Despite the public interest overtones created by the anti-
trust claims, the antitrust-arbitration cases are primarily private disputes
between parties with an ongoing commercial relationship. The disputes them-
selves almost always involve a variety of nonantitrust issues. As a result, it is
clear that the rupture in the parties' relationship would have required some
mechanism for resolution in any event, and the antitrust claims would have been
raised regardless of any special antitrust enforcement incentives. Furthermore,
if special incentives such as treble damages do need to be preserved to ensure
that parties will pursue private antitrust claims, minimal judicial supervision of
the arbitrator selection process and the arbitration hearing will accomplish this
objective.
30 3
The inconsistency in permitting post-dispute arbitration and settlement
agreements but prohibiting future-disputes arbitration clauses in the antitrust
field has been recognized elsewhere in the literature.3° 4 It has been suggested,
however, that whatever inconsistency exists is found in permitting the private
settlement of antitrust claims, not in prohibiting future-disputes arbitration
agreements. 30 5 Any privately assertable right, however, is subject to agreed res-
olution outside the judicial process because there is no effective way to prevent
agreed settlement of private claims even if a great degree of public interest at-
taches to the particular claim. If the law permits private assertion of claims at
all, it is ultimately not feasible to be selective regarding the forum the parties are
allowed to use in resolving the claims. This conclusion is no less true in antitrust
cases. If private enforcement is expected to play a role in implementing national
antitrust policy, the parties to these private disputes must be left to choose their
forum.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 274-78.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 280-83, 288-91.
304. Sterk, supra note 116, at 507-08.
305. Id. at 508.
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VI. JUDICIAI ATTEMT TO ACCOMMODATE ARBITRATION AND
ANTITRUST POLICIES
The courts have attempted a limited accommodation of arbitration and an-
titrust policies. An examination of these attempts reveals that they revolve
around the concepts of severability, permeation, and collateral estoppel.
A. Severability, Permeation, and Collateral Estoppel
When faced with the dilemma of a multifaceted dispute involving nonarbi-
trable antitrust claims as well as arbitrable nonantitrust claims, the courts nor-
mally have treated the claims as severable. Enforcement of the arbitration
agreement has been ordered with regard to the nonantitrust claims, but denied
on the antitrust claims.
The problem that then arises is whether to permit the arbitration hearing
and the antitrust litigation to proceed simultaneously or to require sequential
proceedings. On occasion, simultaneous proceedings have been permitted when
the court has concluded that there would be no substantial overlap between the
factual issues involved in trying the two sets of claims.30 6 Usually, however,
courts have either stayed arbitration pending the outcome of the antitrust litiga-
tion or stayed the antitrust litigation pending completion of court-ordered arbi-
tration.30 7 The standard employed in determining which proceeding to stay can
be summarized as follows: If antitrust issues appear to "permeate" the entire
dispute and the antitrust claims appear on the surface to be fairly strong, then
litigation of these claims will proceed and arbitration of nonantitrust claims will
be stayed.30 8 On the other hand, if the court does not view the antitrust issues as
306. Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1976); Helfenbein v.
International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971). In Helfenbein,
however, after it became apparent to the parties that neither proceeding would be stayed and that the
two proceedings might take place simultaneously, the party against whom the antitrust claim had
been asserted stipulated during oral argument that it waived its right to arbitrate the nonantitrust
claims. Helfenbein, 438 F.2d at 1070 n.1.
307. Cases in which arbitration has been stayed pending antitrust litigation include: Applied
Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Varo v. Compre-
hensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974);
Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1970); Hunt v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aFd, 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984
(1977).
Cases in which antitrust litigation has been stayed pending arbitration include: Roso-Lino Bev-
erage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,296 (2d Cir. 1984)
(per curiam); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874 (2d
Cir. 1976); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972);
NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,297
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Andriot v. Quickprint of Am., Inc. 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah
Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983); D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit
Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l,
Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Black v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 600 (D. Mass.
1975).
In two cases, the courts of appeals remanded for a district court determination of the proper
sequence of arbitration and litigation: A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th
Cir. 1968); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
308. Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.
1978); Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Cobb v. Lewis, 488
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permeating the entire dispute, or if the court perceives the antitrust claims as
being rather weak, the litigation will be stayed and arbitration of the nonanti-
trust issues will be ordered.
309
Regarding the first aspect of this standard, no analytical framework has
been provided for determining whether antitrust claims permeat a given dis-
pute. The permeation doctrine essentially consists of the judge's visceral re-
sponse to the question whether the dispute is basically an antitrust or a
nonantitrust case. The second aspect of the standard involves a rough prelimi-
nary weighing of the merits of the antitrust claim and inevitably shades into the
permeation question.
Collateral estoppel has also played a minor role in courts' efforts to accom-
modate arbitration and antitrust policies. The doctrine of collateral estoppel
provides that a particular issue resolved before one tribunal or in one dispute
generally may not be relitigated before another tribunal or in another dispute
between the same or similarly situated parties. 3 10 Collateral estoppel has several
potential applications to the problem at hand because there usually are factual
issues common to both the antitrust and nonantitrust claims. Thus, if such a
common factual issue is determined initially in either arbitration or litigation, a
question arises whether the parties are collaterally estopped from subsequently
retrying that issue in the other forum.
The Supreme Court has held that federal courts are not statutorily required
to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to all issues determined by an arbi-
trator.3 11 This conclusion has led to the result that certain civil rights questions
determined in the course of labor arbitration may be relitigated in federal
court.3 12 The Court's refusal to treat previous arbitral findings as binding on the
federal courts, however, is applicable only to those issues involving statutorily
created rights to which a paramount public interest attaches. To give any mean-
ingful effect to the congressionally mandated enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments, collateral estoppel must be applied to those issues not characterized by a
predominant public interest.
3 13
Applying these collateral estoppel principles to cases involving antitrust
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974). It is logical to assume that such a decision would effectively kill arbitration
because of the time involved in litigating an antitrust claim.
309. Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
66,296 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466
F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Andriot v. Quickprint of Am., Inc. 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio
1983); Hannah Furniture Co. v. Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983); D.C. Taylor,
Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. I. 1982); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v.
Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Black v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F.
Supp. 600 (D. Mass. 1975).
310. See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); G. & C. Merriam Co.
v. Saalfield, 241 U.S. 22 (1916); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (1897).
311. McDonald v. West Branch, 104 S. CL 1799 (1984).
312. Id.; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
313. See, e.g., Bower v. Eastern Airlines, 214 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954); Goldstein v. Doft 236 F.
Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 353 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 960 (1966).
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claims, courts have held that if a nonantitrust dispute proceeds to arbitration,
any determination by the arbitrator that directly involves an antitrust claim or
that involves a factual issue central to an antitrust claim is not subject to collat-
eral estoppel.314 Consequently, such determinations may be retried in subse-
quent antitrust litigation.315 Those issues unrelated to an antitrust claim,
however, may not be relitigated.
3 16
B. Problems with Existing Accommodation Attempts
If we accept, as is, the existing rule of total nonarbitrability for antitrust
claims under future- disputes arbitration clauses, the courts probably have done
about as well as can be expected in attempting to accommodate arbitration and
private antitrust enforcement policies. There are, however, some significant
problems with the present accommodation structure that are inherent in the
treatment of antitrust claims as nonarbitrable and in the view that arbitration
and litigation must be separate universes.
1. Prejudgment of the Merits of Antitrust Claims
As discussed above, when a court applies the severability and permeation
rules, one aspect of the analysis involves a rough weighing of the strength of the
antitrust claim. This process forces the court to prejudge the surface merit of an
antitrust claim at an unusually early stage.317 This determination is not a deci-
sion on the merits of the antitrust claim, which still may be litigated either
before or after arbitration of the nonantitrust claims, depending on the sequence
ordered by the court.318 However, it seems quite probable that this preliminary
surface weighing will influence any subsequent decision by the court on the mer-
its. For instance, if in ruling on the permeation question the court has decided
that the antitrust claim is weak, it is not illogical to suppose that the court might
feel somewhat committed to that proposition. Such a commitment, although
nonbinding and essentially unofficial, is likely to affect the court's later rulings
on summary judgment motions or other aspects of the litigation. 319 Such a deci-
314. Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 518 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 518-20.
317. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the antitrust claim does state a cause of
action and therefore would survive a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b).
318. In several of these cases, the courts have made substantive comments about the perceived
merits of the antitrust claims despite disclaimers of any intent to rule on the merits. See, e.g., N.V.
Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1976);
Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1974); NPS Communications,
Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); D.C. Taylor,
Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
319. No expression of disrespect for, or lack of confidence in the federal courts is intended by
these comments. The comments are based simply on the knowledge that the judicial process cannot
be purged of human nature; indeed, such dehumanization should not even be desired. See, e.g., B.
CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 20-21, 88-89 (1921); F. CoFMN, THE WVAYS
OF A JUDGE 139-40 (1980); L. FULLER, THE MORAITY OF LAw 229-30 (rev. ed. 1969).
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sion is also likely to influence the bargaining posture of the parties in settlement
negotiations.
The effects of prejudgment are not necessarily bad; they are simply unpre-
dictable and overly susceptible to caprice. The fundamental problem with the
rough weighing of an antitrust claim's facial strength at this stage is that very
little, if any, evidence is likely to have been generated when the arbitrability
question is presented. Indeed, it would be inappropriate and inefficient to have
an evidentiary hearing on the question at this point because the assertion of a
marginal antitrust claim to hinder and delay arbitration would become a much
more effective weapon. In the end, the court is forced into what must be the
uncomfortable position of drawing conclusions about the strength of a claim
primarily from the pleadings.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the extremely fact-sensi-
tive nature of antitrust claims and has cautioned lower courts to be especially
careful in granting summary judgment in antitrust cases.320 When ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the court normally has substantial evidence
before it.32 1 Because summary judgment is a final determination on the merits,
it obviously cannot be viewed as an analog of the court's ruling on the perme-
ation question. Nevertheless, the permeation ruling is quite likely to have a sub-
stantive effect. If courts in antitrust cases are to be extremely cautious about
granting summary judgments, for which there usually is quite a bit of evidence,
it is disquieting to find the type of superficial prejudgment that characterizes
rulings on permeation.
2. Encouragement of Frivolous Antitrust Claims
The rule of nonarbitrability probably encourages assertion of frivolous anti-
trust claims. If a party to the dispute wishes to impede arbitration, one of the
first strategies likely to suggest itself is the introduction of a nonarbitrable claim.
The courts attempt to deal with this problem in rulings on the permeation
question. Indeed, the likelihood of frivolous antitrust claims appears to lie at the
very heart of the permeation doctrine. 322 However, at the stage at which this
320. Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 704 (1969);
Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 (1969); Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). It must be recognized, however, that courts do grant
summary judgment in antitrust cases when truly convinced that no issues of fact exist. Despite the
admonitions of the Supreme Court concerning the need for great caution in granting summary judg-
ment, the incidence of such action seems to have increased in recent years. This trend is most
discernible in antitrust cases brought by terminated distributors; the defendants in such cases are
often granted summary judgment. See P. MARcus, supra note 204, § 78.
321. Although summary judgment can be granted solely on the pleadings under FED. R. CIv. P.
56, affidavits and documentary evidence generated by discovery are usually involved. This is espe-
cially true with respect to antitrust claims, on which courts normally will not grant summary judg-
ment prior to discovery. See, eg., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976);
Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Indus., Inc., 610 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1979); Bogasian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Umdenstock v. American
Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974).
322. Judges have expressed concern about the temptation to interpose a frivolous antitrust claim
for the purpose of hindering or delaying arbitration. See, eg., D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of
Am., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875, 880-82 (N.D. IlM. 1982).
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ruling must be made, it might be very difficult to filter out baseless claims with
any substantial degree of accuracy. The resulting lack of predictability may ac-
tually encourage the use of antitrust claims to hinder and delay arbitration.
3. Employment of Multiple Forums
Treating antitrust and nonantitrust claims as severable for arbitration pur-
poses produces the obvious result of multiple-forum dispute resolution. In our
legal system, there is a strong policy against the use of multiple forums for
resolving the same dispute, different aspects of the same dispute, or even sub-
stantially similar disputes. Manifestations of this policy are numerous, including
the federal rules on unified administration of multidistrict litigation,323 class ac-
tions, 324 consolidation of actions,325 abatement of related proceedings, 326 and
the liberal pleading rules for assertion of counterclaims327 and third-party
joinder.3
28
The employment of two different forums for antitrust and nonantitrust is-
sues would cause far less concern if cases generating both kinds of issues nor-
mally involved two separate disputes. But they do not. As observed earlier, the
cases in which antitrust claims and arbitration agreements are both present usu-
ally involve the rupture of an ongoing commercial relationship and consequent
assertion of several related claims and counterclaims.3 29 There generally is one
basic dispute underlying the case, even though various legal theories often are
intermingled.
330
When different aspects of the same dispute are resolved in different forums,
duplication, confusion, and significant inefficiency are inevitable. Although the
courts pay heed to the existence of common issues and attempt to withhold from
323. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
324. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
325. Id. 42.
326. See, eg., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952) (federal court
can stay an action when the same issues are presented in an action pending in another federal court).
327. FED. IL Civ. P. 13.
328. Id. 14 & 18-22.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63.
330. See, eg., Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coco-Cola Bottling Co., 1984-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 66,296 (2d. Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casu-
alty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 532 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1976); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679
(5th Cir. 1976); Varo v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir. 1974); Cobb v.
Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffler v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466
F.2d 694 (6th Cir. 1972); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 949 (1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., Inc., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 872 (1971); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968);
American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); NPS Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1984-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,297 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); An-
driot v. Quickprint of Am., Inc. 563 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Hannah Furniture Co. v.
Workbench, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1243 (W.D. Pa. 1983); D.C. Taylor, Co. v. Dynamit Nobel of Am.,
Inc., 558 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ii. 1982); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 475 F. Supp.
1282 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 410 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d
68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Black v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 404 F. Supp. 600 (D.
Mass. 1975); Overseas Motors, Inc., v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
aff'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
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the arbitration process those factual issues that are central to the antitrust
claims, 331 redundancy simply cannot be avoided. In disputes of this nature,
there are usually many factual questions that have a direct bearing on both anti-
trust and nonantitrust claims. At the very early stage when the court must at-
tempt to parcel out these issues, it is impossible to predict the variety of factual
questions that will develop later.
Dealer termination cases provide an apt illustration of this overlap of fac-
tual issues. The illustration is even more on point because distribution arrange-
ments commonly incorporate arbitration agreements. A great many of the
private antitrust cases filed each year arise out of a supplier's termination of a
dealer or distributor.332 It is very common in these cases for several antitrust
claims and a variety of nonantitrust claims to be asserted.333 A typical scenario
finds the terminated dealer claiming that the termination resulted from the sup-
plier's implementation of an unlawful scheme such as vertical price fixing and
the dealer's refusal to comply with the arrangement. 334 The supplier, on the
other hand, normally contends that the termination was based on other, legiti-
mate reasons such as breach of the distribution contract, fraud, or the like.335
Usually the dealer asserts the antitrust claims as a plaintiff, the nonantitrust
issues being raised by the supplier as counterclaims or merely as matters of infer-
ential rebuttal, although the supplier can initiate the action, in which case the
antitrust claims are raised by the dealer.
336
The setting just described usually presents antitrust and nonantitrust issues
that are very similar in some aspects of their factual foundations. For instance,
when the dealer alleges that the termination was part of a conspiracy among the
331. See, eg., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1968).
332. See S. OPPENHEIM, G. WEsroN & J. McCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTrrRus LAws: CASES,
TEXT & COMMENTARY 621 n.7 (4th ed. 1981); Bohling, supra note 262, at 1212; Piraino, Distributor
Terminations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested
Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 297 (1982).
333. See, eg., Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 242 (1983); Zell-Aire of New England, Inc. v. Zell-Aire Corp., 684 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1982);
Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp., 638 F.2d 1061 (7th Cir. 1981); Edward J.
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981);
Lafayette Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
334. See, eg., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965);
George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1960).
335. See, eg., Roesch v. Star Cooler Corp., 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1707 (1984) (supplier claimed that dealer breached distribution contract); Bostick Oil Co. v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.) (supplier contended that termination was due to
dealer's lack of service facilities), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242 (1983); Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister,
Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1982) (personality conflict with dealer); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1982) (dealer's fraudulent conduct); Sports Center, Inc. v. Riddell, Inc.,
673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982) (breach of distribution agreement); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v.
Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980) (breach of distribution agreement), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
911 (1981); Lafayette Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1137 (N.D.
Ind. 1982) (dealer's fraudulent conduct); Carr Elecs. Corp v. Sony Corp. of Am., 472 F. Supp. 9
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (dealer's practice of secretly recording phone conversations).
336. This latter situation seems to occur most often when the dealer's open account had a signifi-
cant balance at the time of the termination. See Bartlit, Practical Problems in Terminating Distribu-
tors and Dealers, 42 ANTITRUST L.J. 317, 318 (1974); Panel Discussion, Rejksals to Deal, 42
ANTrrRusT L.L 325, 333 (1974).
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supplier and other dealers to limit price competition at the dealer level, much of
the relevant evidence will focus on the supplier's motives. 33 7 In considering
whether the supplier was motivated by a desire to fix resale prices, the court at
the same time must balance carefully the supplier's evidence pointing to a legiti-
mate business justification for the termination.3 38 This justification evidence will
also bear directly on nonantitrust issues such as the dealer's fraud or breach of
contract.
33 9
Although dealer termination cases provide an excellent illustration, other
situations in which antitrust and arbitration policies collide similarly involve
substantial overlap and redundancy among the antitrust and nonantitrust is-
sues. 34 Consequently, severance of these claims unavoidably produces ineffi-
cient dispute resolution.
C. The Effect of Dean Witter
Very recently, in Dean Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,34 1 the United States
Supreme Court held that when a future-disputes arbitration clause encompasses
nonarbitrable securities law claims as well as arbitrable pendent state law claims,
the arbitrable claims must be severed and submitted to arbitration. According
to the Court, under the Federal Arbitration Act courts have no discretion to
stay arbitration of the arbitrable claims pending litigation of the securities
claims. The Court did not expressly review the fundamental rule of nonarbi-
trability for securities claims because the issue was not presented.
The language of Dean Witter clearly is broad enough to be applied to a case
involving antitrust claims. 342 If the decision is applied in the antitrust context,
the result will be that a court cannot stay arbitration of the arbitrable contract or
tort claims pending litigation of the antitrust claims. Either the antitrust litiga-
tion will be stayed pending arbitration or the antitrust litigation and the arbitra-
tion will proceed simultaneously. It is probable that the permeation doctrine
will continue to be employed in making the choice between these two alterna-
tives; if the antitrust claims are viewed as permeating the dispute and as facially
strong, the antitrust litigation will proceed alongside the arbitration.
Although Dean Witter assumes a strong pro-arbitration posture and clearly
337. See, e.g., Edward . Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 113 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Alloy Int'l Co. v. Hooker-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d 1222, 1225
(7th Cir. 1980); Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co., 325 F.2d 196, 200 (9th Cir. 1963).
338. See, e.g., Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 702 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 242 (1983); Bruce Drug, Inc. v. Hollister, Inc., 688 F.2d 853 (1st Cir. 1982); Sports Center,
Inc. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc.,
637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981).
339. See, e.g., Lafayette Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1137,
1149 (N.D. Ind. 1982); Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp., 514 F. Supp. 890 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd,
712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1707 (1984); Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of
Am., 471 F. Supp. 793 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 677 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1982); Carr Elecs. Corp. v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 472 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 288-91.
341. 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985).
342. Id. at 1241-43.
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is a step in the right direction, it just as clearly does not go far enough. In the
antitrust context, severing the arbitrable nonantitrust claims from the nonarbi-
trable antitrust claims will cause the same problems of antitrust claim prejudg-
ment and multiple forum usage that currently exist.
VII. POTENTIAL FOR FuRTHER ACCOMMODATION
A. The Impracticability of Resolving the Conflict by Completely Precluding
Arbitration
The problems inherent in existing accommodation' attempts could be
avoided if the courts simply refused to permit arbitration of any of the claims in
cases involving antitrust issues. An argument can be formulated for refusing to
sever and for holding the arbitration agreement completely unenforceable. The
public interest in private antitrust enforcement, the strong public policy against
employing multiple tribunals in the same dispute, and the inherent difficulties
encountered in severing antitrust and nonantitrust claims could be combined to
support the conclusion that an arbitration agreement, if applied to cases involv-
ing antitrust issues, violates public policy and is void under section 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act.
There are obvious problems with this argument. First, Dean Witter proba-
bly would not permit such a result given the Court's holding that arbitrable
claims must be arbitrated. 343 Second, even if legally possible, such a proposition
is conceptually flawed: the strong policy in favor of arbitration can just as easily
be combined with the policy against multiple forums and the difficulties of sever-
ance to support precisely the opposite conclusion. In other words, it is just as
plausible to argue that the policy in favor of private antitrust enforcement is
outweighed in these circumstances by several other policies, and that all of the
claims should be arbitrated.
B. The Need for Enhanced Accommodation
There can be no perfect reconciliation of the policy in favor of arbitration
and the policy in favor of private antitrust enforcement. Several factors, how-
ever, support the conclusion that arbitration policy outweighs private antitrust
enforcement policy in the types of cases in which the conflict normally arises.
Almost all of the rationales for denying arbitrable status to antitrust claims are
subject to substantial refutation. 344 Even the rationale that is most durable
under criticism-the effect of future-disputes arbitration agreements on private
enforcement incentives-can be refuted, although possibly not so thoroughly as
other rationales. 345 If any incentive-related concerns still remain after close
scrutiny, they can be satisfied with little intrusion into the arbitral process. 346
Because of these factors, an effort should be made, either judicially or legisla-
343. See supra text accompanying notes 341-42.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 152-292.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 246-92.
346. See infra text accompanying notes 348-64.
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tively, to achieve greater accommodation between arbitration and antitrust poli-
cies by changing the present rule and permitting all of the issues, antitrust and
nonantitrust alike, to be resolved in the arbitration process.
The arguments presented in this Article demonstrate the high probability
that private antitrust enforcement policy will not be adversely affected by al-
lowing antitrust issues to go to arbitration in accordance with the parties' con-
tract.3 47 If necessary to assuage fears that arbitration may reduce private
enforcement incentives, the court can ensure that these incentives remain by
imposing limited judicial supervision over the arbitration process.
1. Forms of Judicial Intervention
All that may be necessary to protect against the remote possibility of dimin-
ished antitrust enforcement incentives is limited judicial supervision of the arbi-
trator selection process. This could be accomplished in a variety of ways, and
the parties themselves should always have as much latitude as possible in mak-
ing the selection. The court's involvement could begin with a condition attached
to its order compelling arbitration under section 4 of the Act.348 This proviso
would make judicial approval of the arbitrator or arbitration panel selected by
the parties a condition precedent to the effectiveness of the order. The court
could impose time limits and employ its contempt power to prevent lack of co-
operation by one party from hindering or delaying arbitration. In this way, the
court could ensure the ultimate selection of arbitrators who have the kind of
backgrounds that would make them sensitive to antitrust policy and more likely
to apply the relevant antitrust principles presented and argued by the parties.
Typically, courts would require the appointment of attorneys or law teachers
with antitrust expertise, industrial organization economists, or retired judges.
349
The court could also provide brief instructions to the arbitrators relating to
critical incentive-affecting issues such as treble damages and the prima facie ef-
fect of a relevant prior decree in a government antitrust suit.350 The court could
exercise an extremely limited review at a later point solely for the purpose of
determining whether the arbitrator gave consideration to these legal doctrines.
The instructions and possible subsequent review normally should not go beyond
issues such as these because the natural advantages of the arbitration process
probably vary inversely with the degree of judicial intervention. Moreover, the
court's directives on these matters should do no more than outline the applicable
law and emphasize the arbitrator's responsibility to follow it. The court should
not become involved in any factual determinations or indicate how particular
principles should be applied in a given case. Thus, something far less encom-
passing than jury instructious is envisioned. Anything beyond a simple adum-
bration of the pertinent incentive-related legal principles must be left to the
arbitrator and opposing counsel.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 246-92.
348. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 196-203.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 268-83.
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The court also ought to avoid becoming involved in the discovery process
unless convinced that the antitrust claims cannot receive a hearing without
court-ordered discovery. This situation would rarely occur, and in those unu-
sual cases in which court intervention is deemed necessary, the court's involve-
ment should be minimal. Any discovery ordered by the court must have the
limited objective of placing the essential core of the antitrust claim before the
arbitrator and ensuring that the arbitration proceeding does not simultaneously
develop the ills which characterize discovery in most antitrust litigation.
3 51
Turning arbitration into a facsimile of antitrust litigation is the last thing that
should result from enhanced accommodation.
2. Legal Authority for Judicial Intervention
The persisting notion that the arbitral and judicial forums are mutually ex-
clusive institutions is grounded not so much in the absence of judicial authority
to supervise arbitration as it is in convention and stereotype.352 Legal authority
presently exists for courts to undertake any supervision of the arbitration pro-
cess necessary to accommodate the perceived conflict between arbitration and
antitrust policies.
The authority of a federal court to oversee the arbitrator selection process,
provide limited instructions to the arbitrator, conduct a skeletal form of judicial
review, and possibly grant minimal assistance in discovery can be derived readily
from several sources. For example, the court's power to appoint special masters
under rule 53 could be employed. 353 Although this power is to be exercised
351. See supra text accompanying notes 210-20.
352. See Note, supra note 243, at 1452-55.
353. FED. R. Civ. P. 53. The text of rule 53, as amended in 1983, is as follows:
(a) Appointment and Compensation. The court in which any action is pending may
appoint a special master therein. As used in these rules the word "master" includes a
referee, an auditor, an examiner, and an assessor....
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In
actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are compli-
cated; in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult
computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some excep-
tional condition requires it. Upon the consent of the parties, a magistrate may be desig-
nated to serve as a special master without regard to the provisions of this subdivision.
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his powers and
may direct him to report only upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts or
to receive and report evidence only and may fix the time and place for beginning and
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's report. Subject to the specifications
and limitations stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise the power to regulate
all proceedings in every hearing before him and to do all acts and take all measures neces-
sary or proper for the efficient performance of his duties under the order. He may require
the production before him of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference, includ-
ing the production of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and writings applicable
thereto. He may rule upon the admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by the
order of reference and has the authority to put witnesses on oath and may himself examine
them and may call the parties to the action and examine them upon oath. 'When a party so
requests, the master shall make a record of the evidence offered and excluded in the same
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only in "exceptional circumstances," 354 a conflict between two preeminent pub-
lic policies certainly seems to qualify as such a circumstance. In the past, there
has been substantial dissatisfaction with the use of special masters, 355 but this
dissatisfaction seems to have stemmed largely from improper selection and inad-
equate supervision. 356 In recent years federal courts have been making increas-
ing and innovative use of special masters in various types of litigation,35 7 and the
possibility of an expanding role for masters has been given substantial scholarly
attention.358 The United States Supreme Court has indicated that special mas-
ters normally should not render decisions on the merits and, consequently,
manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence
for a court sitting without a jury.
(e) Report.
(1) Contents and Filing. The master shall prepare a report upon the matters submit-
ted to him by the order of reference and, if required to make findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, he shall set them forth in the report ...
(2) In Non-Jury Actions. In an action to be tried without a jury the court shall accept
the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous ...
(3) In Jury Actions. In an action to be tried by ajury the master shall not be directed
to report the evidence. His findings upon the issues submitted to him are admissible as
evidence of the matters found and may be read to the jury, subject to the ruling of the court
upon any objections in point of law which may be made to the report.
(4) Stipulation as to Findings. The effect of a master's report is the same whether or
not the parties have consented to the reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a
master's findings of fact shall be final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall
thereafter be considered.
(f) A magistrate is subject to this rule only when the order referring a matter to the
magistrate expressly provides that the reference is made under this Rule.
Id.
354. Id. 53(b). See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (court congestion and
complexity of case was not an exceptional condition warranting reference of entire trial to a special
master).
355. See C. WRIoIrr, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 97, at 656 (4th ed.
1983).
356. See, eg., Cheramie v. Oregon, 434 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1970).
357. See, eg., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (reference of all social security benefit
cases to magistrate, serving as master, was upheld); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982)
(master given extremely broad powers to monitor compliance with prison reform decree); Gary W.
v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979) (use of master to aid implementation of decree in prison
reform case); Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975) (use of master to conduct evidentiary
hearings and file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law); Hart v. Community School Bd.,
383 F. Supp. 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (use of master to aid implementation of decree in school desegre-
gation case).
358. See e-g., Aronow, The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases The Evolution of
Roles in the Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation, 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 739
(1980); Berger, Away From the Court House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special Master, 78
COLUM. L. Rnv. 707 (1978); Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 1979 AM. B.
FoUND. RESEARCH J. 543; Brazil, Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters Is Rule 53 a Source
ofAuthority and Restrictions?, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 143; Brazil, SpecialMasters in the
Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Potential and Problems, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 287;
Dobray, The Role of Masters in Court Ordered InstitutionalReform, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 581 (1982);
Hazard & Rice, Judicial Management of the Pretrial Process in Massive Litigation: Special Masters
as Case Managers, 1982 AM. B. FoUND. REsEARCH J. 375; Kirp & Babcock, Judge and Company:
Court-Appointed Masters, School Desegregation, and Institutional Reform, 32 ALA. L. REv. 313
(1981); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates (pts. 1 & 2), 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070, 1297 (1975).
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should not perform arbitrator-like functions.35 9 The context in which these
views have been expressed, however, is entirely different than the one at hand.
Those situations in which courts have expressed reservations about the use of
special masters to serve in decision-making roles have not involved ageements by
the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.3 6° Instead, any decision-mak-
ing role played by the special master would have been imposed on the parties
without their agreement. When there is an arbitration agreement, however, the
parties already have agreed to employ a parajudicial decision maker.
If the court chose to supervise the selection of an arbitrator by molding its
power of special master appointment, it could accomplish any oversight of the
arbitration process deemed necessary in much the same way. The order of refer-
ence employed under rule 53 to appoint a special master similarly could be
molded to provide necessary instructions, and the power of review over the
master's findings inheres in the court's appointment power.
36 1
Although legally feasible, the court's use of rule 53 to supervise arbitrator
selection might not be wise. Despite the fact that the traditional stigma attached
to the use of special masters appears to be fading, there remains substantial an-
tagonism toward the practice. Moreover, as will be seen shortly, federal courts
have ample power to supervise arbitrator selection aside from rule 53 or other
special dispensation.
It would also be legally feasible for the court to use a federal magistrate,
acting as a master,362 although this course probably would not be desirable for
at least two reasons. First, the parties would lose their role in the selection
process, as the magistrate is already identified and on the federal payroll. Sec-
ond, because the magistrate has a close and continuing relationship with the
federal court, he or she probably would have difficulty conducting the proceed-
ing as an arbitration hearing. Thus, a proceeding conducted before the magis-
trate likely would take on the character of litigation and lose many of the
positive traits of arbitration.
It really is not necessary for the court to employ either its power of special
master appointment or its authority to use the magistrate as a master in order to
oversee the arbitration process. By interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act as
not permitting arbitration of antitrust claims under future-disputes clauses, the
federal courts have clearly exhibited sufficient judicial power to accommodate
359. See Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974).
360. The courts traditionally have shown antagonism toward the employment of masters to per-
form a decision-making function even when the parties have so stipulated. See Wilver v. Fisher, 387
F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967); Bartlett-Collins Co. v. Surinam Navigation Co., 381 F.2d 546 (10th Cir.
1967). In these cases, however, there have not been agreements to arbitrate, and, consequently, the
strong federal policy in favor of arbitration has not provided a countervailing consideration.
361. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b), (e)(2).
362. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1982) (authorizes judge to designate a magistrate "to serve as a
special master pursuant to the applicable provisions of this title and the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure"). A 1983 amendment to rule 53 abolished the authority of the district courts to appoint
"standing masters" because the creation of full-time magistrates eliminated the need for standing
masters. See Comment, An Expanding Civil Role for United States Magistrates, 26 AM. U.L. REv.
66 (1976); Note, United States Magistrates Additional Duties in Civil Proceedings, 27 CAsE W. Ras.
L. REV. 542 (1977).
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the policies of the Act with other public policies in virtually any way they see fit.
If the courts have the power to completely deny arbitrable status to antitrust
claims, they certainly have the power to do less by permitting arbitration with a
degree of supervision. Allowing arbitration with minimal oversight clearly in-
volves the exercise of less judicial power than does the exclusion of an entire
category of disputes from the legislatively expressed rule of enforceability for
arbitration agreements. By formulating the doctrines of severability and perme-
ation, 363 the courts have also recognized that their inherent equity powers are
quite extensive. The inherent equity powers of the federal courts could be simi-
larly employed to accomplish reasonable supervision of both the arbitrator selec-
tion process and the arbitration hearing.
364
3. Experience with Judicially Supervised Arbitration
Much of the conceptual underpinning for the rule that antitrust and other
claims to which a public interest attaches should not be submitted to arbitration
is found in the view that arbitration and litigation are irreconcilably separate
institutions. 365 There has been sufficient past experience with the integration of
these institutions, however, to indicate that such integration could help resolve
the conflict between arbitration and antitrust policies. Several states, including
Pennsylvania and California,366 and also some federal districts, 367 have em-
ployed court-annexed arbitration with some success. In some ways these exper-
iences are clearly different from judicially supervised arbitration of antitrust
disputes. Existing uses of court-annexed arbitration involve mandatory, non-
consensual arbitration for designated types of claims, and because of the absence
of an arbitration agreement, the parties must be given meaningful rights of ap-
peal.3 68 The types of claims heretofore involved in court-annexed arbitration
are rather different from antitrust claims, normally being contract and tort
claims below a specified dollar amount.369 But these experiences show that arbi-
363. See supra text accompanying notes 306-10.
364. Federal courts have full equity powers under the Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.
1. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); C. WIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 356,
436-38, 610-16 (4th ed. 1983).
365. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82, 192-203.
366. See D. HENSLER, A. LIFSON & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA: THE
FIRST YEAR (1981); Levin, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 537 (1983); Rosen-
berg & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer: Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74
HARV. L. REv. 448 (1961). Other states that have adopted mandatory arbitration systems include
Alaska, Arizona, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Washington. See D. HENSLER,
A. LIFSON & E. RoLPH, supra, at vii n.1.
367. See A. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1981); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Federal
Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REv. 787 (1983).
368. In actuality, the "appeal" normally provided is a trial de novo, with sanctions imposed on
the party who obtains the trial de novo but does not thereby improve his or her position. See D.
HENSLER, A. LIFSON & E. ROLPH, supra note 366, at viii; Levin, supra note 366, at 539.
369. Levin, supra note 366, at 538. Mandatory arbitration originally was employed for relatively
small claims, but in several programs the dollar limits have been increased in recent years to such an
extent that the claims subject to mandatory arbitration no longer can be characterized as small. The
dollar limit in the Pennsylvania program has climbed from $1,000 to $20,000. Id. The dollar limit
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tral and judicial processes can work together. Along the same lines, arbitration
has been used as an adjunct to litigation in carrying out the terms of antitrust
consent decrees in the film industry37 0 and in implementing the provisions of
administrative consent orders in several Federal Trade Commission proceed-
ings. 371 Although this use of arbitration is also not perfectly analogous to the
use proposed in this Article, it does indicate that adjudicatory and arbitral
processes can augment one another.
VIII. CONCLUSION
With almost complete unanimity, courts and commentators have viewed
antitrust claims as nonarbitrable under future-disputes arbitration clauses. This
conclusion has been reached despite strong congressional expression of a policy
in favor of arbitration. Several rationales have been provided for the nonarbi-
trability rule, most of which break down rather quickly upon close analysis. The
one rationale that best endures challenge is that incentives for private antitrust
enforcement are likely to be reduced if antitrust claims are treated as arbitrable
under future-disputes clauses. This argument, however, is subject to refutation
as well. In the types of disputes in which the question almost always arises,
private antitrust enforcement incentives are not likely to be affected significantly
by permitting arbitration.
Minimal judicial supervision will suffice to satisfy any apprehension that
antitrust policy will be affected adversely by the arbitration of antitrust claims.
That supervision can be accomplished in a variety of ways, and there is ample
legal authority for any necessary oversight by the courts.
All that is probably necessary to ensure that private antitrust enforcement
incentives are not diminished is minimal judicial supervision of the arbitrator
selection process. Although other forms of judicial intervention are legally au-
thorized and are probably feasible, they should not be employed unless particu-
lar circumstances convince the court that the antitrust claims and legal
principles relevant thereto will not receive a hearing otherwise. Judicial over-
sight should never be permitted to such a degree that it substantially diminishes
the positive characteristics of arbitration; intervention of such a degree is just
not required to protect antitrust policy adequately.
There is, moreover, some experience to indicate that the arbitral and judi-
cial institutions are not mutually exclusive but complement one another to a
greater degree than generally has been realized. In the end, the perception of
these institutions as irreconcilably disjoined probably lies at the core of the un-
satisfactory accommodation efforts currently practiced. Such a perception does
not seem to be what Congress had in mind when it provided for various types of
in the mandatory arbitration program in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California is $100,000; in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania it is $50,000. Id. at 538, 539 n.9.
370. See Hayes, Arbitration as an Aid in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws, 17 LAW. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 504 (1952).
371. See Halverson, Arbitration and Antitrust Remedies, 30 ARn. J. 25 (1975).
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judicial action to implement the federal policy in favor of arbitration. 372
Futhermore, the relationship between the arbitral and judicial systems is symbi-
otic-the courts provide implementation and enforcement mechanisms for arbi-
tration, and arbitration presents great opportunities for relieving court
congestion and delay.
Dean Pound observed long ago that the success of various extrajudicial dis-
pute resolution mechanisms such as equity and the law merchant ultimately de-
pends on the extent to which these institutions are reconciled with the judicial
system.373 This observation seems no less applicable to arbitration.
Finally, those who emphasize the disparateness of arbitration and litigation
would do well to keep in mind the words of Jerome Frank:
The judge, at his best, is an arbitrator, a "sound man" who strives to
do justice to the parties by exercising a wise discretion with reference
to the peculiar circumstances of the case. . . . The bench and bar
usually try to conceal the arbitral function of the judge. . . . But
although fear of legal uncertainty leads to this concealment, the arbi-
tral function is the central fact in the administration of justice. The
concealment has merely made the labor of judges less effective. 374
372. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
373. Pound, Justice According to Law, 14 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 18 (1914).
374. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 157 (1930).
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